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BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS: CRITIQUE AND SUGGESTIONS
IN order to achieve the bankruptcy goal of compromise between debtor
and creditor interests,' an honest bankrupt is not only discharged from most
of his previously-incurred obligations, 2 but is allowed to have a minimum
amount of property exempted from distribution among his creditors.3 Such
exemptions are the result of a legislative reconciliation of two competing
social policies. On the one hand, a commercial society's dependence upon
credit necessitates the enforcement of borrowers' obligations. Any freedom
of assets from legal seizure reduces the moral and legal duty to repay, thereby
adding to the creditor's risk of loss and retarding lending.4 On the other, in
a community which is concerned with the well-being of its individual members,
the social cost of leaving a debtor and his family without resources may
outweigh the economic disadvantages of immunizing property from the claims
of creditors.; As might be expected, the struggle between these policies has
engendered political controversy throughout American history, and legislative
sympathy with the debtor class has fluctuated with the economic barometer.6
1. See generally GLENN, LIQUIDATION 337-74 (1935). MAOLAcHLAN, BANKRUPTCY
1-24 (1956) ; MOORE, CASES ON DEBTOaS' AND CREDITORs' RIGHTS 1-1.1 (1955).
The administration of debtors' estates is governed by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30
Stat. 544, as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-112 (1952), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 32-107 (Supp.
V, 1958). [Hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act. Sections of the act will be cited as they
appear in BANKRUPTCY ACT (Collier pamphlet ed. 1956). The corresponding United States
Code section numbers may be ascertained by adding 0 to § 1, 9 to § 2, 18 to §§ 3-17, 23
to §§ 18-32, 28 to §§ 33-54, 36 to §§ 55-60, and 40 to §§ 61-72. The first 72 sections,
dealing with "ordinary bankruptcy," are the only ones relevant to this Comment.]
The power to enact a federal bankruptcy act is specifically granted by the Constitution:
.. Congress shall have the power ... to establish . . .uniform laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
Problems peculiar to life insurance exemptions are generally outside the scope of this
Comment. For a recent treatment of such exemptions see Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and
Creditors' Remedies in the United States, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583 (1957).
2. Bankruptcy Act § 17 allows the discharge, with few exceptions, of all provable
debts, as defined in § 63. Generally, only debts arising prior to filing of the petition in
bankruptcy are provable. Bankruptcy Act § 63(a). Discharge will be denied under § 14
(c) if the debtor has committed perjury, concealed or destroyed his property or records,
obtained money through a false statement, or failed to explain satisfactorily any loss of
any assets. See In re Underhill, 82 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1936).
3. Bankruptcy Act § 6.
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, TECH. BuL. No. 288, FAR. MORTGAGE CREDIT
1-7 (1932). "The farmer, owning two hundred acres of fine black land [in Texas], might
very conservatively show a net worth of over $30,000 ... and yet have no basis of credit
except, indeed, his character." SCHWALST, THE EXTENSION OF BANK CREDIT 32 (1.927).
5. " . . . [T]he State . . . [has an interest] ... in its exemption laws, to the end
that owners of exempt property and their families shall not be reduced to absolute desti-
tution, thus becoming a charge upon the public." Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So. 2d 792, 794
(Fla. 1954). See also Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1289 (1950).
6. See generally WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HIsToRY (1935) [here-
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The first national bankruptcy act, enacted by the Federalists in 1800 after
the 1792 and 1797 panics had resulted in widespread imprisonment for debt,7
provided only for involuntary proceedings against merchants and traders.8
Bankrupts were granted an allowance for support while the proceedings were
pending;9 and certain wearing apparel and household necessities 10 plus a
small percentage of other assets, varying according to dividends paid to
creditors,'1 could be retained as exempt property. The Jeffersonians, resent-
ful of the act's abuse by wealthy speculators, repealed it three years later.12
Despite a severe depression in the 1820's 13 and the limitations placed upon
inafter cited as WARREN]; Poteat, Debtors' Exemptions: A Study in Credit Administra-
tion, June 1933 (unpublished thesis in Yale Law Library) [hereinafter cited as PorEA-].
7. James Otis of Massachusetts described the need for a bankruptcy law as follows:
Misfortune, enterprise, speculation and a spirit of overtrading, have involved thou-
sands in ruin. . . .Men fail for millions and though these great leviathans of
speculation, after sunk in the ocean for a time, may rise again and revel on the
surface, yet the widows and orphans, the fair merchants, industrious tradesmen,
and credulous friends, who are involved in the same whirlpool, rise no more. To
prevent these mischiefs, we should give to creditors a control over the property of
their debtors, so as to stop the fraudulent in their careers, and we should rescue
the honest and unfortunate insolvent from the oppression of a vindictive creditor.
Quoted in WARREN 17.
8. An Act To Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19
(1800) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 0, 2 Stat. 00].
9. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 53, 2 Stat. 34. T nder present English law the trustee
may, with the permission of the Committee of Inspection, make an interim allowance to
the bankrupt for the support of himself and his family. WILLIAMS, BANKRUPTCY PRac-
TicE 225, 240, 269-73 (14th ed. 1932).
10. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 5, 2 Stat. 23.
11. A bankrupt was allowed:
five per cent. upon the nett produce of all the estate that shall be recovered in and
received, which shall be paid unto him or her by the assignee ... , in case the
nett produce of such estate, after such allowance made, shall be sufficient to pay
the creditors of said bankrupt ... the amount of fifty per cent. on their said debts,
respectively, and so as the said five per cent. shall not exceed, in the whole, the
sum of five hundred dollars; and in case the nett produce of the said estate shall,
over and above the allowance hereafter mentioned, be sufficient to pay the said
creditors seventy-five per cent. on the amount of their said debts, respectively, that
then the said bankrupt shall be allowed ten per cent. on the amount of such nett
produce.., so as such ten per cent. shall not... exceed the sum of eight hundred
dollars; ....
Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 34, 2 Stat 30. If the estate did not yield 50% to creditors
the bankrupt received "so much money as the commissioners shall think fit to allow, not
more than three hundred dollars, nor exceeding three per centum on the nett proceeds.
." Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 34, 2 Stat. 31.
12. Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; see PoTEAT 6; WARREN 19-20. Besides
its abuse by the rich, general dissatisfaction over the act resulted from the difficulty of




state debtor relief by the Constitution's "obligation of contracts" clause,14 no
new federal bankruptcy legislation was passed until 1841.
The 1841 act, stemming from a crash touched off by overspeculation in
government land,'0 introduced voluntary bankruptcy proceedings and granted
a small exemption for wearing apparel, household furniture and other neces-
saries worth up to $300.13 Since creditors resented the discharge under the
act of more than 28,000 bankrupts for one-tenth of their outstanding obliga-
tions 17 and debtors found the low exemptions less beneficial than those pro-
vided by most state laws,'8 the act was repealed after eighteen months. 19
A period of relative prosperity, and the passage of state laws which ameliorated
the effects of mortgage foreclosures and further extended exemptions may
explain the abence of federal legislation for the following twenty-five years.2 0
But the economic disorder following the Civil War, precipitated a new bank-
ruptcy act in 1867.21 To satisfy the western states, whose exemption pro-
visions were generally liberal, local exemptions were incorporated for the first
time if they exceeded the act's uniform allowance 22 which, although modeled
on its 1841 counterpart raised the dollar value to $500.23 To enlist the sup-
14. "No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts."
U S. CONST. art. I, § 10. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 120 (1819)
(invalidating a New York statute which allowed discharge of debts incurred prior to
passage of the state statute).
When a federal bankruptcy act is in effect, it pre-empts state legislation which pro-
vides for a discharge or otherwise closely resembles the federal statute. See generally
Radin, What is a Bankruptcy Act?, 20 A.B.A.J. 792 (1934) ; Johnson v. Star, 287 U.S.
527 (1933) ; International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
15. See WARREN 52-63.
16. An Act To Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 442
(1841) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act of 1841, § 0, 5 Stat. 000]. In addition, the
assignee (the counterpart of the modern trustee in bankruptcy) had discretion, up to the
dollar limit, to designate exemptions "having reference . . . to the family, condition, and
circumstances of the bankrupt . . . ." Bankruptcy Act of 1841, § 3, 5 Stat. 443.
17. In the short period the act was in effect, debtors received discharges of nearly
$445,000,000 in obligations upon the surrender of only $45,000,000 worth of property.
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 69 (1843).
18. WARMEN 82.
19. An Act To Repeal the Bankruptcy Act, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843).
20. WA.RREN 87-88.
21. 'An Act To Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517
(1867) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act of 1867, § 0, 14 Stat. 000].
After the Civil War began, debts due Northern merchants from the South were large-
ly wiped out. "In 1861, 913 mercantile houses in New York became insolvent. . . . Out
of 256 solvent dry goods houses in New York at the beginning of the war, only 16 were
solvent at the end of the first year." WAmREN 97.
22. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, § 14, 14 Stat. 523, quoted at note 23 infra. A previous
bill had been defeated because of the failure to incorporate state exemptions. WARN
100, 103.
23. . . . there shall be excepted from the operation of the provisions of this section
the necessary household and kitchen furniture, and such other articles and neces-
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port of veterans, a soldier's uniform and equipment were also exempted. 24
Expense and corruption in the act's administration caused immediate dis-
satisfaction, 25 but the Panic of 1873 and liberalizing amendments forestalled
repeal for eleven years.26
Following this repeal, growing realization of the need for permanent bank-
ruptcy legislation, led to agitation for Congressional action.27 The Panic of 1893
and collapse of western land values emphasized this need, and resulted in the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.28 This act, which is still in force, makes both voluntary
and involuntary discharge more generally available.29 Its sixth section in-
corporates the exemption laws of the bankrupt's domiciliary state, but unlike
its predecessors the current act provides no federal minimum.30
Although it is usually assumed that exemptions are important in enabling
a debtor to begin a new financial life, the sixty-year old policy of incorporating
state statutes into the Bankruptcy Act has never been fully reexamined.
The recent growth of welfare legislation suggests that insolvents can be re-
habilitated at the expense of the entire community, rather than by their
creditors alone.3 ' The allowance of exemptions may severely injure general
creditors; in over ninety per cent of all current individual bankruptcies, no
saries of such bankrupt as the said assignee shall designate and set apart, having
reference in the amount to the family, condition, and circumstances of the bank-
rupt, but altogether not to exceed in value, in any case, the sum of five hundred
dollars; and also the wearing apparel of such bankrupt, and that of his wife and
children ... ; and such other property as now is, or hereafter shall be, exempted
from attachment, or seizure, or levy on execution by the laws of the United States,
and such other property not included in the foregoing exceptions as is exempted
from levy and sale upon execution or other process or order of any court by the
laws of the State in which the bankrupt has his domicile at the time of the com-
mencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, to an amount not exceeding that al-
lowed by such State exemption laws in force in the year eighteen hundred and
sixty-four ....
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, § 14, 14 Stat. 522-23.
24. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, § 14, 14 Stat. 523.
25. 'See WARREN 112-14.
26. Id. at 110, 1.14-22.
27. Id. at 128-34.
28. Id. at 134-41; PoTEAT 8-9.
29. See Bankruptcy Act § 4.
30. See notes 11, 16, 23 szpra. Section 6 allows exemptions ... which are prescribed
by the laws of the United States ... ." Under federal statutes, pensions, soldiers' bonuses,
homesteads on federal land, railroad retirement benefits and soldiers' savings are exempt
from levy or seizure. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY f[ 6.17 (14th ed. Moore 1956) [hereinafter
cited as COLLIER].
Incorporation of state exemptions does not violate the constitutional requirement that
a bankruptcy act be "uniform." Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902);
see note 1 supra.
31. See HANNA & MACLACHLAN, CASES ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION 95 (5th ed. 1957).
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BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS
assets remain after exemptions for distribution to them.3 2 But even if the re-
tention of exemptions is necessary, there are major flaws in the present
system. Incorporation of state law engenders unwarranted diversity and
often requires the application of legislation enacted without consideration
of possible bankruptcy consequences.3 3 In addition, many state exemption
provisions are hopelessly out of date, and the Bankruptcy Act itself, as
judicially construed and sporadically amended, often emasculates their pur-
poses. These factors suggest that the role of exemptions should be re-
evaluated. This Comment will first analyze state statutes. Thereafter, the
problems of their incorporation in bankruptcy will be presented. Finally, the
need for traditional exemptions will be considered in the light of welfare
legislation, and methods of restructuring exemptions to meet contemporary
requirements will be suggested.
STATE EXEMPTION STATUTES
Like early federal bankruptcy legislation, state exemption statutes were
fashioned on an anvil of nineteenth century economics and politics. A narra-
tive of the relevant history of three states-Georgia, Texas, and Connecticut-
will serve to illustrate their development.
Georgia's economy was based on single-family agriculture throughout most
of the nineteenth century.3 4 Her first exemption statute, enacted in 1822, was
designed to protect the small farmer through allowance of a few domestic
necessities and tools of the trade to heads of families.35 When Congress failed
to provide adequate national debtor relief after the depression of 1837, Geor-
gia, like many other states, created a homestead exemption, which placed
32. U.S. ADmiNISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY
STAnsTIcs 2-3 (1957).
33. Virginia seems to be the only state which attempts to coordinate exemptions with
bankruptcy.
VA. CODE ANN. § 34-17 (1950) provides:
The real or personal estate which a householder, his widow or minor children are
entitled to hold as exempt may be set apart at any time before it is subjected by
sale or otherwise ... , provided that (1) any person who files a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy may set it apart before or on the same day that he files his petition
but not thereafter, or (2) any person against whom an involuntary petition in bank-
ruptcy is filed may set it apart at any time before the expiration of the period
after its adjudication within which he is required to file his schedules.
This statute is not an invalid interference with the Bankruptcy Act. In -re Swift, 96 F.
Supp. 44 (W.D. Va. 1950).
34. POTEAT 13-14.
35. "Whereas it does not comport with justice or expediency to deprive innocent and
helpless women and children of a means of subsistence: . . . two beds and bedding, com-
mon bedsteads, a spinning-wheel, and two pair of cards, a loom, and cow and calf, com-
mon tools of his trade, and ordinary cooking utensils, and ten dollars' worth of provisions
[ . . fare exempt]." 1 NEw DIG. OF LAWS OF GA. 385 (Cobb 1851). In 1834 the legis-
lature, added the family Bible to this list. 1 id. at 388.
19591 1463
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
twenty acres of land (plus five additional acres for each child) beyond the
reach of a householder's creditors.36
The state was impoverished after the Civil War due to the collapse of con-
federate currency, emancipation, and successive crop failures.3 7 Very liberal
exemptions were included in the post-bellum constitution in order to secure
its ratification: a homestead up to $2,000 in value and personal property not
in excess of $1,000.'8 The highest state court applied these exemptions retro-
actively to debts contracted prior to the constitution 3' but was overruled by
the Supreme Court.40 A constitutional convention in 1877 signaled the end
of the carpetbagger regime.41 Destitute, the state required credit to finance
further rehabilitation.42 Therefore, a constitutional provision reduced the
value of exemptions and allowed partial waiver. Realty and/or personalty
"to the value in the aggregate of sixteen-hundred dollars" became a house-
holder's maximum exemption, and he could "waive or renounce in writing
his right to the benefit of the exemptions ... except as to wearing apparel
and not exceeding three hundred dollars worth of household and kitchen
furniture and provisions." 43 These provisions remain substantially unaltered
today, although the constitution of 1945 granted the legislature power to pre-
scribe laws relating to waiver of homestead. 44
Unlike Georgia, Texas' exemptions have remained relatively rigid. The
large homestead exemption of the 1845 constitution was probably a conscious
effort to implement the policy of attracting new setters45 and to counteract
the supposed evils of a "credit" system.4 6 The 1876 constitution, reacting to
pro-creditor carpetbagger rule, provided, as a check on northern lending in-
terests, 47 for an even more generous homestead exemption-200 acres of
36. This homestead was limited to "white citizens" and to qualify for the additional
5 acres, the child must be under fifteen. I id. at 389.
37. POTmAT 17.
38. GA. CoNsT. art. VI (1868); see POTEAT 17-18.
39. See Hardeman v. Downer, 39 Ga. 425 (1869).
40. Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872) (Georgia exemption violative of
obligations of contracts clause as applied to debts contracted prior to its enactment).
41. See PorAT 20-21.
42. Ibid.
43. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1877).
44. GA. CONST. art IX (1945). The legislature, however, has continued the provision
of the 1877 Constitution allowing waiver up to $300. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1101 (1937).
45. See Comment, 46 YAix L.j. 1023, 1025-28 (1937). Other states have utilized ex-
emptions as a means of encouraging immigration. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63
HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1290 (1950). See also PoTEAT 29; 2 Tax. LAws 35 (1838-1846)
(allowing an immigrant head of a family to acquire 640 acres of land from the state by
paying surveyor's fees).
46. POTEAT 28-29.
47. Finty, Texas' Sacred Homestead Law, 10 NA'. MuNIc. Rav. 459 (1921) (pur-




rural land of unlimited value and a city lot worth up to $5,000.48 Further,
most encumbrances upon the homestead were prohibited.49 These 1876 pro-
visions remain in force today, despite criticisms that limitations on homestead
mortgages unduly restrict credit.r0
Creditor-oriented Connecticut 51 stands in sharp contrast to both Texas and
Georgia. In 1711 the colonial legislature enacted Connecticut's initial exemp-
tion law, which immunized a debtor's "apparel, bedding, tools, arms or im-
plements of his household necessary for upholding life.' ' r2 From time to time
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries other specific items were
cautiously added; but by 1882 the list of personal property exemptions reached
virtually its present state, 3 And the modest $1,000 homestead exemption,
finally enacted in 1885," was abolished in 1958.r5 Reflecting prevailing puri-
tanical attitudes towards thrift and economic responsibility, the courts, through
rigid construction, diminished the utility of even these exemptions.5 6
The Antiquarianism and Variety of State Exemptions
State laws exempting property from execution and sale, usually rooted in
the nineteenth century, fail to aid the modem debtor.57 Presumably useful in
a rural society, specific property exemptions have little relevance today when
48. Tax. CONST. art. XVI, § 51. Improvements on both urban and rural property
are exempt, and the city lot or lots are valued as of the time it was acquired as a home-
stead. The Texas constitution is unique in that it also provides for a "business" home-
stead. Rural or city property is thus exempt if it is used either for the "purposes of a
home" or "as a place to exercise the calling or business of the head of a family." Texas
courts have extended the exemption to all machinery annexed to the real estate. Willis
v. Morris, 66 Tex. 628, 1 S.W. 799 (1886).
49. TEX. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 50. Encumbrances resulting from purchase money mort-
gages, taxes due, or improvements are allowed. Ibid.
50. See ScHwuLsT, THE EXTENSION OF BANK CREIT 32 (1927). See also Higgins
v. Bordages, 88 Tex. 458, 31. S.W. 52 (1895) (holding that an assessment for paving a
sidewalk not a tax within the exception to the prohibition on encumbrances). See note
49 supra. As a result of this decision permanent street improvement in Texas cities was
greatly retarded. Finty, supra note 47, at 460.
51. See Davenport v. Lacon, 17 Conn. 278 (1848) ("The great principle regulating
the intercourse of debtor and creditor in this state, has been that all of the property of
the debtor should be responsible for the debts of the owner.") ; Enscoe v. Dunn, 44 Conn.
93 (1876).
52. See Conn. Acts & Laws 1784, at 61, reenacting colonial laws.
53. PoTrAT 41-43.
54. Conn. Pub. Acts 1885, ch. 113, § 1.
55. Conn. Pub. Acts 1958, ch. 27, § 42.
56. See, e.g., Hewitt v. McNerney, 73 Conn. 565 (1901.) (refusing exemption of the
implements of a spectacle maker as tools of the trade since defendant was a manufacturer
and not retailer and therefore, not engaged in "trade") ; Atwood v. DeForest, 19 Conn.
512 (1849).
57. See 11 N.Y. JUDICL% CoUNcIL REP. 263 (1945); Hess, Homestead, Personal
Property, and Wage Exemptions in Missouri and in other States, 12 Mo. L. REv. 21, 41-
46 (1947).
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wealth is measured by liquid assets, not acres, animals and artisans' tools.
In Connecticut, for example, it would be rare to find an urban resident owning
two tons of coal, two hundred pounds of wheat flour, two tons of hay, two
cords of wood, five bushels of turnips or ten bushels of Indian corn. s Simi-
larly, exemptions for implements of the trade now have little utility, since
few men work with their own tools.59 Moreover, many statutes operate un-
evenly, for legislatures have responded to particular interest groups by exempt-
ing specialized property such as ferryboats, newspaper presses, and molasses
mills.6 0 The archaism of these statutes is accentuated by the general failure
to effect an increase in value during recent periods of inflation. 61 New York
and Maine, for example, defeat the original purpose of protecting the poor
homeowner and his family by retaining a $1,000 limit on homestead exemp-
tions, and thereby permitting execution sale of virtually any homestead .
2
58. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-352 (1958).
59. See GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 306 (rev. ed. 1940). Perhaps the most
significant groups owning their own capital goods are lawyers, doctors, and other profes-
sionals. Most states provide that a professional man's library is exempt to a specified
maximum value. E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3504 (1950); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 550.37(8) (Supp. 1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.435(11) (1952); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 9-26-4(2) (1957).
60. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3836 (1945) (ferryboat); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 550.37(9) (Supp. 1958) (newspaper presses); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 272.18(11)
(1958) (printing presses) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 307(o) (1957) (molasses mill and equip-
ment).
Other special-interest exemptions include: CAL. CIV. PRoC. CODE ANN. §§ 690.4 (a
physician's bicycle), 690.6 (miner's equipment), 690.8 (fishing boats and nets), 690.13
(nautical instruments) (1955) ; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4902 (1953) (a seamstress'
sewing machine); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3504 (1950) (spinning wheels); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 112, § 67(X) (1954) (same); ORE. REV. STAT. § 23.164 (1957) (mobile
house trailer) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 272.18(13) (1958) (equipment of land title abstrac-
tor).
61. See MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 157 n.6 (1956) ; Haskins, supra note 45, at 1293.
California is the outstanding exception to the general rule, having increased homestead
exemptions twice in recent years to a current maximum of $12,500. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN.
§ 1260 (1954). Alaska and Illinois have also recently enacted upward revisions of home-
stead exemptions. ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN. § 55-9-79 (Supp. 1958) (from $2,500 to
$8,000 in 1.957) ; ILL RV. STAT. ch. 52, § 1 (1957) (from $1,000 to $2,500 in 1957).
62. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 671; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 112, § 69 (1954). The
New York homestead exemption was first reexamined in 1945, sxty-nine years after its
original incorporation into the Code of Civil Procedure. See 11 N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL
REP. 263 (1945). The Judicial Council refused to recommend an increase in value, be-
lieving that the public policy of the state favored a limited homestead. Id. at 269-70.
Thus, in many states, where the value of the property exceeds the exemption, the
property may be sold and any proceeds above the maximum exemption used to satisfy
creditors' claims. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, §8 10-12 (1957); MIcr. STAT. ANN. §§
27.1579-80 (Supp. 1957) ; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr §8 676-77. The Ohio statute, on the other
hand, more fully protects the family home from forced sale. Where the value of the house
and lot exceeds the exemption and cannot be divided without manifest injury or incon-
venience the creditor is required, in lieu of sale, to accept all annual fair rental in excess
BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS
Such antiquated statutes tempt courts to adapt exemptions to contemporary
conditions by verbal manipulation. As a result, the interpretation of exemp-
tion legislation has been uneven, and, in some instances, bizarre. Despite the
general rule that statutes in derogation of the common law receive strict con-
struction, most courts have declared that exemptions should be liberally con-
strued to accomplish their humanitarian and remedial purposes.6 3 Thus justi-
fied, some include automobiles under laws exempting "wagons"64 and allow
expensive jewelry to escape liability for debts as "wearing apparel" or "tools
ot the trade." 5 Occasionally pianos qualify as "household furniture"; at other
of $100, as determined by appraisers, until the debt, costs and interest are paid. Sale will
be consummated only upon a failure by the debtor to meet the rental payments. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.78 (Page 1954) ; cf. New Martinsville Grocery Co. v. Hannibal
Store Co., 65 Ohio App. 50, 29 N.E.2d 226 (1940). See generally Haskins, mtpra note
45, at 1312-15.
63. See 1. COLLIER 6.03, at 796; 2 FREEMAN, EXECUTIONS 1062-64 (3d ed. 1900).
Illustrative cases include Im re Trotter, 97 F. Supp. 249 (WD. La. 1951) ; Williams v.
Swann, 220 Ark. 906, 251 S.W.2d 111 (1952); Shepard v. Findley, 204 Iowa 107, 214
N.W. 676 (1927); First Nat'l Bank v. Tiffany, 40 Wash. 2d 193, 242 P.2d 169 (1952).
Some states have incorporated a rule of liberal construction into their statutes. E.g.,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-216 (1955).
A few states, however, predominantly in the Northeast, cling to the rules of strict
construction. E.g., Beierlein v. Faulkner, 15 N.J. Misc. 313, 190 Atl. 853 (Dist. Ct. 1937)
Reinhart v. Gerhardt, 152 Pa. Super. 229, 31 A.2d 737 (1943).
64. E.g., Printz v. Shepard, 128 Kan. 210, 276 Pac. 811 (1929) ; McMullen v. Shields,
96 Mont. 191, 29 P.2d 652 (1934) ; Stichter v. Southwest Nat'l Bank, 258 S.W. 223 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924). Other jurisdictions, however, have given "wagon" a much more literal
interpretation. E.g., In re McEuen, 19 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Ky. 1937) ; Poznanovic v.
Maki, 209 Minn. 379, 296 N.W. 415 (1941). As late as 1934, a New York court, although
agreeing that a wagon was exempt as part of a "team," refused to include an automobile
within the term on the ground that a vehicle, to be exempt, must be one to which a horse
was ordinarily attached. Northern N.Y. Trust Co. v. Bano, 151 Misc. 684, 273 N.Y. Supp.
695 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
Some courts have exempted automobiles as "carriages," "buggies" and "vehicles." E.g.,
Patten v. Sturgeon, 214 Fed. 65 (8th Cir. 1914); Hickman v. Hickman, 149 Tex. 439,
234 S.W.2d 410 (1950). See also Clark v. Vitz, 190 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945)
(house trailer placed on blocks outside owner's house and used as office, library and den
not exempt as vehicle, but exemption allowed as part of homestead).
A few state statutes specifically exempt automobiles. See, e.g., Wade v. Rathbun, 23
Cal. App. 2d 758, 67 P.2d 765 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937) ; Youdan v. Kelley, 267 Mich. 616,
255 N.W. 342 (1934) (motor vehicle); White v. Corbett, 101 Mont. 1, 52 P.2d 156
(1935). Where a state statute specifically prohibits automobile exemptions or fails to
mention them at all, exempt status may still be obtainable as a tool, implement or instru-
ment necessary for a trade, profession or business. E.g., Pellish Bros. v. Cooper, 47 Wyo.
4S0, 38 P.2d 607 (1934) ; Gunn v. Credit Serv. Corp., 46 So. 2d 628 (La. Ct. App. 1950).
But see Law v. Simon, 110 Colo. 545, 136 P.2d 520 (1943).
65. E.g., Sellers v. Bell, 94 Fed. 801, 812 (5th Cir. 1899) (wearing apparel) ; In re
Richards, 64 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. Tex. 1946) (same); Ii re L L. Evans & Co., 158 Fed.
153 (D. Del. 1907) (same) ; it re Coller, 1,11 Fed. 503 (D. Mass. 1901) (,watch exempt
as tool of trade of cabinet-maker because it enabled him to keep true account of time he
and other employers spent on jobs outside factory). Some statutes exempt specific items
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times they do not.0 6 Similarly, when the value limitations on a homestead
are construed to exclude improvements, wealthier debtors receive a windfall
because of heavy investment in their property.67 Liberalism, however, has not
eliminated literalism. A generous exemption can be lost through noncompli-
ance with technical procedures for claiming and describing exemptions. For
example, a recent case denied a homestead exemption because of an incorrect
statement of the number of the lot in question.68
In addition to problems created by quaint statutes painfully interpreted, a
serious lack of uniformity exists among the states. The statutes run the gamut
from sketchiness to specificity. 69 Exemptions vary in amount from one hun-
dred dollars worth of personal property plus wearing apparel and tools (but
no homestead) in Maryland,7 ° to California's $12,500 homestead exclusive of
liens and encumbrances, and a substantial list of personal property items.71
Some states exempt liquid assets as well: earned wages and a small cash
of jewelry. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 112, § 67 (1954) (watch, wedding or engage-
ment ring up to $10 each). Most courts, however, have declined to extend protection to
jewelry in the absence of express statutory language. E.g., Rivas v. Noble, 241 Fed. 673
(5th Cir. 1917); In re Everleth, 129 Fed. 620 (D. Vt. 1904) ; Towns v. Pratt, 33 N.H.
345, 349 (.1856); Franzier v. Barnum, 1.9 N.J. Eq. 316 (ch. 1868).
66. Compare Cook v. Fuller, 35 Okla. 339, 130 Pac. 140 (1913) (piano exempt as
household furniture) ; Kemp v. Swainsboro Ice & Fuel Co., 47 Ga. App. 99, 169 S.E. 700
(1933) (same); and Alsup & Thompson v. Jordan, 69 Tex. 300, 6 S.W. 831 (1887)
(same), with Kehl v. Dunn, 102 Mich. 581, 61 N.W. 71 (1894) (piano not exempt as
household furniture) ; Dunlap v. Edgerton, 30 Vt. 224 (1858) (same) ; Tanner v. Bill-
ings, 18 Wis. 163 (1864)'(same); and Ladker v. Gordon, 88 N.Y.S.2d 758 (App. T. 1949)
(same).
Compare It re Tidball, 40 F.2d 560 (D. Wyo. 1930) (typewriter and phonograph not
household furniture); and Dunbar v. Spratt-Snyder Co., 208 Iowa 490, 226 N.W. 22
(1929) (radio not exempt as musical instrument), with Brake v. Graham, 214 Ala. 10,
13, 106 So. 188 (1925) (piano and phonograph exempt to surviving spouse as household
furniture); and In re Thompson, 15 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 516 (Ref. D. Minn. 1929)
(radio-phonograph combination exempt as furniture or musical instrument).
A recent case held that a television set did not qualify for exemption as household
furniture or a musical instrument. Michaelson v. Elliott, 209 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1954),
affirming 113 F. Supp. 929 (D. Minn. 1953). But some states make television sets ex-
pressly exempt by statute. E.g., OaE. RFV. STAT. § 23.160(5) (1957).
67. See Haskins, supra note 45, at 1292-93 & n.31.
68. Esten v. Cheek, 254 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1958). Although espousing the California
rule of liberal construction of exemptions, the court denied a homestead exemption be-
cause the debtor filed "Lot 104, in his declaration but resided on "Lot 204." The declara-
tion conformed in all other respects to the California statute. See also Lynch v. Stotler,
215 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1954) (declaration invalid for failure to state an estimate of cash
value).
69. For examples of the more general statutes, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4902
(1953) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 1, 13 (1957) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 8, 11 (1957).
For examples of detailed and specific statutes, see CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 690-
90.25 (1954) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 26-201, 26-301 (1955).
70. See MD. ANN. CoDE art. 83, §§ 8, 11 (1957).
71. CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 1260 (1954) (homestead exemption; a person other than
the head of a family is also entitled to a $5,000 homestead) ; CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE ANN.
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allowance in lieu of specific property are fairly common, 7 2 while California's
provision for a thousand-dollar building-and-loan certificate represents the
extreme of generosity.73 Rural acreage limits range from forty acres coupled
with a maximum value,74 to Texas' 200 acre homestead of unlimited worth.75
Although variations are so great as to make generalizations dangerous, it is
evident that western exemptions are greater than those of pro-creditor eastern
jurisdictions.7 Regional economic differences may properly account for minor
variations, but more outstanding disparities cannot be justified when tested
by population shifts westward, industrialization of the south and the growing
interrelationship of the national economy.
The Dinzinished Utility of Exemptions
Myriad legislative and judicial exceptions render exemptions even less valu-
able. While commonly defined as a right to hold property free from seizure
§§ 690-90.25 (1954) (personal property exemptions). The listing of personal property
items, exclusive of exceptions thereto and procedures for claiming, covers 26 sections in
the code, and includes items such as washing machines, beehives, waiters' uniforms, en-
tertainers' wardrobes, homestead association shares, and well drilling machinery as well
as all the standard items.
72. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 690.11 (1954) (wages); ILL. Rav. STAT.
ch. 62, § 14 (1957). (same); NED. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-1558 (1948) (same); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 235, § 34 (1956) ($20 worth of shares in a co-operative association);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 8 (1957) (money) ; N.D. REv. CODE §§ 28-2203, 28-2205 (1943)
(same); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.62, 2329.66 (wages), 2329.81 ($500 in lieu of
homestead) (Page 1953). See also Gray v. Putnam, 51 S.C. 97, 28 S.E. 149 (1897)
(homestead exemption available in money).
73. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 690.21. (1954). California also permits $1,000
worth of homestead association shares to be held exempt if the debtor does not own a
homestead. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE ANN. § 690.12 (1954).
74. E.g., Iowa CODE ANN. § 561.2 (1950) (40 acres, maximum value $500); MicH.
STAT. ANN. § 27.1572 (Supp. 1957) (40 acres, maximum value $2,500).
Many states permit up to 160 acres to be held as a rural homestead, but provide a
maximum value limitation. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 625 (1940) ($2,000 maximum) ;
ALASKA CouP. LAWS ANN. § 55-9-79 (Supp. 1958) ($8,000 maximum; one-fourth acre
in cities) ; LA. CoNsT. art. 11, § 1 ($4,000 maximum) ; Mo. STAT. Am. § 513.475 (1952)
($1,500 maximum); OxaA. CoNsT. art. 12, § 1; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 2 (1955)
($5,000 maximum). Montana allows 320 acres of agricultural land to be held as a home-
stead, but the maximum value is $2,500. MONT. REy. CODE ANN. § 33-124 (1954).
Other states have various combinations of acreage and value limitations. See general-
ly NATIONAL Ass'N OF CREDIT MEN, CREDIT MANUAL op COMIIERCIAL LAWS 269-78
(1959) ; Haskins, supra note 45, at 1291-93; Hess, supra note 57, at 23-26.
75. TEX. CoNsT. art. 16, § 51; TEX. Rxv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (1945).
Several other states also have acreage limitations without providing for a maximum
value. E.g., FLA. CONsT. art. 10, § 1 (160 acre rural; one-half acre in cities); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 510.02 (1947) (80 acres) ; S.D. CODE § 51.1710 (1939) (160 acres).
76. NATIONAL ASS'N OF CREDIT MEN, op. cit. supra note 74, 269-78 (1959) (charts
of state exemptions); Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 1023, 1031 (1937). The following juris-
dictions, all located in the East, are the only ones which provide no homestead exemption
at all: Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and the District
of Columbia.
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and sale under legal process for the payment of debts, 77 an exemption does
not extend to the claims of all creditors. Thus, in some states, a debtor is
free to waive his right to an exemption,78 and creditors can therefore insist
on waiver as a condition of a loan. In addition to consensual limitations, ex-
emptions are usually statutorily circumscribed. To encourage home acquisi-
tion and improvement, homestead exemptions are often inapplicable against
purchase-money lenders, mechanics and materialmen.79 Similarly, wage,80
tort,8 ' and tax claimants 82 are often able to levy upon generally immune
assets. Moreover, all property is available for the satisfaction of alimony and
support obligations, since the family is the very group exemptions are de-
signed to protect.83
77. See, e.g., Clark v. Nirenbaum, 8 F.2d 451, 452 (5th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270
U.S. 649 (1926) ; Poore v. Bowlin, 150 Tenn. 412, 414-15, 265 S.W. 671 (1924); Pickens
v. Pickens, 125 Tex. 410, 414, 83 S.W.2d 951, 954 (1935); BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY
681-82 (4th ed. 1951).
78. See notes 221-22 infra and accompanying text.
79. E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 1241 (1954) (mechanics, materialmen and vendors
liens) ; IL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 3 (1957) (purchase money and improvements) ; MINN.
CONST. art. 1, § 12 (construction, repairs and improvements); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
510.01 (repair and improvement), 510.05 (laborers and materialmen) (1946); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. ACT § 671 (purchase money); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.72 (Page 1953);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 272.20 (1957) (purchase money, mechanics and materialmen). See
generally Haskins, supra- note 45, at 1303-06.
Many states also provide that personal property exemptions shall be inapplicable
against purchase money creditors. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 690.50 (1954);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37 (Supp. 1958); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 665(8); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 272.18(30) (1957); Wyo. Comtp. STAT. ANN. § 3-4510 (1945) (purchase money
exception extends to all exemptions).
80. E.g., ILL. Rrv. STAT. ch. 52, § 16 (1957) ; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 12; N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. ACT § 665 (8).
81. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 627.7 (1950) (no motor vehicle exempt from judg-
ment for damages resulting from use on highway).
Courts have refused to allow exemptions against tort claims on the ground that stat-
utes exempting property from liabilities for "debts" are not meant to include claims ex
delicto within the meaning of "debt." E.g., Erlenbach v. Cox, 206 Ala. 298, 89 So. 465
(1921) ; Hill v. Bush, 192 Ark. 181, 90 S.W.2d 490 (1936) ; cf. Oakley v. Lasater, 172
N.C. 96, 89 S.E. 1063 (1916). Contra, Smith v. Omans, 17 Wis. 395 (1863). See gen-
erally 2 FREETAN, EXECUTIONs 1371-72 (3d ed. 1900) ; Note, 25 MINN. L. REv. 66, 77-
78 (1940).
82. E.g., ARK. CONST. art. 9, § 3; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 671; Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 272.20 (1958). Contra, CAL. Cirv. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 690.27 (1955) (tax debtor en-
titled to all personal property exemptions). Some states, however, provide that home-
steads shall be exempt from real property taxation. See Haskins, supra note 45, at 1307-
08; Newcomer, The Growth of Property Tax Exemptions, 6 NAT'L TAX J. 1.16, 121-24
(1953); Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 1023, 1037-40 (1937).
83. E.g., In re Flanagan, 31 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1940); Commons v. Bragg, 183
Okla. 122, 80 P.2d 287 (1938) ; Gaskins v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 30 Cal. App. 2d
409, 86 P.2d 681 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939) ; IowA CODE ANN. §§ 627.11, 627.12 (1950). See




Another hindrance upon the efficacy of state exemptions comes from the
federal constitution. State attempts at modernization or enlargement of
exemptions are partially hampered by the prohibition against state impair-
ment of contractual obligations."4 The Supreme Court, by declaring the means
of enforcement available at the time of the loan a part of the debtor's repay-
ment agreement, has disallowed exemptions enacted after the incurrence of
the obligation.8 5 Under this doctrine; revision of exemption provisions may
operate in futuro only, and cannot furnish debtor relief at times when it has
been determined by legislatures to be most necessary. 80 Indications exist, how-
ever, that in the context of economic crisis the impairment-of-contracts rule
has been weakened. For example, during depression periods state legislatures
have been permitted to declare mortgage moratoria,8 7 and to retroactively in-
crease exemptions.8 8 While the Supreme Court decisions relaxing the strin-
84. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
85. Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S.
595 (1877); Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S. 126 (1921) ; Worthen Co. v. Thomas,
292 U.S. 426 (1934). State cases following the Supreme Court have also invalidated
retrospective application of exemption increases. E.g., Herrington v. Godbee, 157 Ga. 343,
121 S.E. 312 (1924); Daniel v. Thigpen, 194 La. 522, 194 So. 6 (1940); Rieger v. Wil-
son, 102 Alont. 86, 56 P.2d 176 (1936) ; see In re Rauer's Collection Co., 87 Cal. App.
2d 248, 196 P.2d 803 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
Although quite inconsistent with the rationale for voiding exemption increases, the
impairment of contracts clause has not been applied to statutes which lessen or abrogate
exemptions. But the cases do not explain why the borrower's contractual anticipation can
be defeated. See Sparger v. Cumpton, 54 Ga. 355 (1875) ; Brearley School v. Ward, 201
N.Y. 358, 94 N.E. 1001 (1911); Laird v. Carton, 196 N.Y. 169, 89 N.E. 822 (1909);
Leak v. Gay, 107 N.C. 468, 12 S.E. 312 (1890) ; Chandler v. Horne, 23 Ohio App. 1, 154
N.E. 748 (1926).
Prior to Gunn v. Barry, supra, some state cases held that modifications of exemptions
did not impair the obligations of pre-existing debts. E.g., Maxey, Gordan & Co. v. Loyal,
38 Ga. 531 (1868); Morse v. Goold, 11 N.Y. 281 (1854); Hill v. Kessler, 63 N.C. 437
(1869). The decisions were based on Chief Justice Taney's dictum in Bronson v. Kinzie,
42 U.S. (1. How.) 310, 315 (1843), to the effect that exemption changes are a question
of remedy and do not impair the basic obligation to pay. The dictum was expressly re-
pudiated in Edwards v. Kearzey, supra.
86. See In re Towers, 146 F. Supp. 882, 885 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd Sub nomn.
Towers v. Curry, 247 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Comment, 1 STAN. L. REV. 350 (1949).
87. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), 34 CoLum. L.
REv. 361, 47 HARv. L. REv. 660. Subsequent cases further weakened the impairment-of-
contracts rule in favor of overriding state interests. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury
Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942) (upholding New Jersey Municipal Finance Act which ad-
justed claims of municipal creditors) ; Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941)
(upholding New York statute restricting amount of deficiency judgments); Honeyman
v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939) (similar); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310
U.S. 32 (1940) (state may safeguard the solvency of building and loan associations in
the public interest by restricting rights of certificate holders).
88. In re Durband, 8 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Iowa 1934) ; cf. Folsom v. Asper, 25 Utah
299, 71 Pac. 315 (1903) ; Kirkman v. Bird, 22 Utah 100, 61 Pac. 338 (1900). The Utah
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gency of the contracts clause involved emergencies resulting from the depres-
sion of the 1930's, post hoc alteration of creditors' rights in inflationary per-
iods-less catastrophic but more devastating to the debtor who relies upon his
exempt property-could be similarly justified. The problem may be viewed
as one of balancing the policy of safeguarding debtors from inflation's erosive
effects against that of protecting creditors' expectations. If the state's deter-
mination is reasonably limited and suitably framed to effectuate the former,
the obligations-of-contracts clause should be satisfied.89
Limitations on Exemptions Due to Conflict of Laws
Beyond the difficulties encountered in modernization, a state may find its
policy of protecting debtors through exemptions frustrated by unfortunate
conflict of laws precedents. In this area, the Supreme Court (in contra-
distinction to its view when dealing with the contracts clause) regards ex-
emption statutes as affecting remedy only. Therefore, they are considered
procedural for conflicts purposes, 90 and thus not applied in a foreign forum.
Consequently, a creditor can escape the exemption statute of the state in
which the obligation was incurred, and in which both parties reside, by suing
his debtor in another jurisdiction. 91 This can be easily accomplished by
assigning the claim to a third party outside the state. Since exemptions
normally apply only to residents 9 2 the protection of the forum will also be
court, prior to Blaisdell, supra note 87, refused to follow Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S.
595 (1877), and upheld retrospective application of exemptions on grounds of necessity.
But see Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (exemption increase fails since
legislation was not limited to the emergency upon which legislature sought to justify en-
actment) ; In- re Fox, 16 F. Supp. 320 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
The Supreme Court has indicated an unwillingness to look behind a state declaration
of an overriding policy necessitating retroactive alteration of creditors' rights. See East
N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33 (1945). Therefore the constitutional pro-
scription can be avoided by "temporarily" raising exemptions, and continually passing
extensions. Once sufficient time has elapsed, and all outstanding contracts were entered
into during the period of the increased exemption, the legislation can be made permanent.
Re-enactments of remedial legislation after frequent reconsiderations were impliedly ap-
proved in the New York mortgage moratory legislation. East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn,
supra at 233-35. Giving permanent status to the periodic extensions would then be much
easier, for repeal might result "'in an emergency more acute than that which the original
legislation was intended to alleviate.'" N.Y. LtGis. Doc. No. 45, 165th Sess. 25 (1942),
cited in East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, supra at 235.
89. This argument is more elaborately presented in Comment, 1 STAN. L. REv. 350
(1949).
90. See Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899); Baumgardner v.
Southern Pac. Co., 177 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); 3 BEALE, CONFLICrs OF LAWS
1616 (1935).
91. See Boykin v. Edwards, 21 Ala. 261 (1852) ; Kyle & Co. v. Montgomery, 73 Ga.
337 (1884); American Central Ins. Co. v. Hettler, 46 Ill. App. 416 (1892).
92. 'See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(18) (1947) ; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-
5813 (1947) ; NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-1556 (1948). Even where statutes are silent
1472 (Vol. 6S: 1459
BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS
denied and the debtor deprived of the benefit of any exemption.93 The garnish-
ment remedy makes evasion of local exemptions more readily available.94
Since an obligor may be garnished wherever his obligee could have sued him,
creditors can defeat an exemption by garnishing in a foreign jurisdiction. 95
Wage exemptions are particularly subject to such subversion, for corporate
employers can be sued in any state where they are "doing business." 90
Although some states have attempted to prevent such facile avoidance of
exemptions, their efforts are exceptional, and, even when available, of limited
use. A few states make the assignment of a claim for the purpose of escaping
local exemptions a criminal offense, 97 and several give the debtor a damage
action against the assignor-creditor.98 Some state tribunals will enjoin a
creditor from proceeding with a foreign suit which will evade local exemption
statutes,99 but personal jurisdiction over the creditor is necessary, and, if the
creditor is willing to risk a contempt action upon his return to the enjoining
as to the applicability of exemptions, non-residents may not qualify. Boykin v. Edwards,
21 Ala. 261 (1852); Mignogna v. Chiaffarelli, 151 Mo. App. 359, 131 S.W. 769 (1910).
But see Menzie v. Kelly, 8 IlL App. 259 (1881.).
93. See Mooney v. Union Pac. R.R., 60 Iowa 346, 14 N.W. 343 (1882); Ferneau v.
Armour & Co., 303 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
94. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (judgment against garnishee in foreign
state entitled to full faith and credit in subsequent action by principal debtor even though
the principal debtor was not served).
The Harris case settled the rule that a debt may be garnished in any state where
personal jurisdiction over the secondary debtor is obtained. Thus, the debt is located
wherever the garnishee may travel, if an individual, or be served, if a corporation. This
rule has been criticized for making the garnishee vulnerable to spurious claims in remote
jurisdictions. See Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rein to Compel Payment of a
Debt, 27 HARv. L. REv. 107, 121. (1913). But courts have gone far in allowing such
actions. See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 153 Ore. 248, 56 P.2d 336 (1936) (debt due Nebraska
resident from New York corporation may be garnished in Oregon where corporation had
filed consent to service).
95. Lyon & Co. v. Callopy, 87 Iowa 567, 54 N.W. 476 (1893) ; Burlington & M.R.R.
v. Thompson, 31 Kan. 180, 1 Pac. 622 (1884); Bingenheimer Mercantile Co. v. Weber,
49 N.D. 312, 191, N.W. 620 (1922).
96. See cases cited note 95 supra.
97. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-209, 46-9901 (1937) (each assignment a mis-
demeanor punishable by a fine of not less than $10.00 and not more than $50.00) ; IND.
STAT. ANN. § 10-4904 (1956); ILL REv. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 19, 20 (1957).
98. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 46-210 (1937) (authorizing suit against either the as-
signor or assignee to recover the amount garnished, costs and damages sustained includ-
ing those resulting from loss of employment, discharge or suspension of work); IND.
STAT. ANN. § 10-4904 (1956). In addition to providing a civil remedy for recovery of
exemptions defeated by an out of state proceeding, Maryland law provides that all the
property of the defendant-creditor shall be subject to execution to satisfy the plaintiff-
debtor's judgment. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 83, § 15 (1956).
99. See Allen v. Buchanan, 97 Ala. 399, 11 So. 777 (1892) ; Wierse v. Thomas, 145
N.C. 261, 59 S.E. 58 (1907) ; Moton & Son v. Hull, 77 Tex. 80, 13 S.W. 849 (1890) ;
ef. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890) (not a violation of full faith and credit
for a state to enjoin one of its citizens from executing on property in another state).
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state, the foreign court is free to proceed and may well ignore the injunction.100
More significantly, the foreign action may have reached judgment before the
debtor is aware of it and can take defensive steps. 1°1 And if the suit is insti-
tuted by garnishment, the resulting lien creates a "superior equity," entitled
to recognition in other states, and thus precludes an effective injunction as
soon as it attaches. 02 Only on rare occasions have courts protected an out-of-
state debtor by invoking the discretionary principle of comity and applying the
exemptions in force in the debtor's domicile, 0 3 or by refusing to entertain
the proceeding if the creditor's evident purpose is the avoidance of another
jurisdiction's statutes. 0 4
The accordance of full faith and credit to foreign exemption statutes would
protect the debtor regardless of the locus of the suit. The Constitution re-
quires states to give the public acts of a foreign state the same effect they
have at home.10 5 This aspect of the full faith and credit clause has been long
dormant, but recent decisions indicate a new vitality. Thus state courts
are required to enforce statutory causes of action created by other jurisdictions
where none exists in the forum state as long as her citizens enjoy similar
rights and she has no public policy against such suits.10 6 Although exemptions
100. Union Pac. R.R. v. Rule, 155 Minn. 302, 193 N.W. 161 (1923) (full faith and
credit need not be accorded foreign injunction against prosecuting a suit in forum) ; cf.
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909). But cf. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346
(1912). See also Messner, The Jrisdiction of A Court of Equity over Persons To Com-
pel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the State, 14 MiNx. L. Rnv. 494,
497, 505 (1930) (concluding that these cases suggest that an injunction by a foreign
court against proceedings in the forum state need not be granted full faith and credit
unless the forum itself would have granted an injunction under the facts disclosed).
101. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), requires that the garnishee, in order to
protect himself from double liability, notify the debtor of the pending garnishment pro-
ceedings. While such notification may enable the debtor to appear and defend, it places
an expensive burden upon him to travel out of state to protect his rights. See Holt, The
Federal Interpleader Act and Conflict of Laws in Garzishment, 4 U. Cm. L. REv. 403,
408 (1937). If service on the principal debtor is only made by publication and he fails
to appear, the garnishee to avoid a second liability to the debtor, must have raised the
defense that the property was exempt in the garnishment action. See In re Beals, 116
Fed. 530 (D. Ind. 1902).
102. Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 204 (1934).
103. Schroeder Wine & Liquor Co. v. Willis Coal & Mining Co., 179 Mo. App. 93,
161 S.W. 352 (1913) ; Strawn Mercantile Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 S.W. 473 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925).
104. See Drake v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 69 Mich. 168, 37 N.W. 70 (1888) (where
principal debtor, his creditor and garnishee all resided in Indiana, and all claims arose
there, Michigan forum refused to lend itself to the evasion of Indiana's laws). See also
ILL. REV. STAT. cb. 52, § 21. (1957) (requiring application of the wage exemption laws
of a debtor's residence to garnishment in Illinois if the wages were earned outside of
Illinois).
105. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
106. First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952) (Illinois may
not bar an action under the Utah wrongful death act even though the Illinois wrongful
death act only extended to deaths within the state); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951) (Wisconsin required to apply Illinois wrongful death statute).
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vary widely in character and amount, few if any states could claim that a sister
state's exemption violates her public policy. While states are not required to
enforce each others "procedural" statutes, 0 7 the traditional classification of
exemptions as "procedural" for conflicts purposes is inappropriate. The justi-
fication for nonapplication of "procedural" statutes-administrative conven-
ience 10s..is unpersuasive in the context of exemptions, which could be easily
applied by a foreign jurisdiction and create expectations similar to so-called
"substantive" rights.'0 9 Therefore the Supreme Court should require that they
be given full faith and credit.
STATE EXEMPTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY
Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court over Exempt Property
Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act incorporates state exemptions by providing:
"This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which
are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the State laws in force
at the time of the filing of 'the petition in the State wherein they have had
their domicile ...."
While bankruptcy courts must follow state law in determining what is
exempt, 0 federal bankruptcy law regulates the procedure by which exemp-
tions are claimed and exempt property set apart for the debtor." A bankrupt
is required to surrender all of his assets-both exempt and non-exempt-to
the trustee in bankruptcy. He then must petition for the return of any items
which he contends are not subject to the trustee's claims." 2 Failure to claim
an exemption within a reasonable time after the petition is filed constitutes
a general waiver." 3 The trustee is empowered to determine tentatively what
107. 3 BEALE, CONFLICr OF LAWS 1600 (1935).
103. 'See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J.
333 (1933). See also Note, 47 HARv. L. REv. 315 (1933).
109. Exemption laws are treated as substantive for purposes of the obligations of
contract clause of the Constitution. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
110. See Dixon v. Koplar, 102 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Arbogast v. Gottfried, 58
F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1932) ; In re Baker, 182 Fed. 392 (6th Cir. 1910) (where state court
has announced a reasonably clear rule as to a particular statute, bankruptcy court is not
justified in disregarding it on belief that the state court may later change rule). But cf.
In re Sullivan, 148 Fed. 815 (8th Cir. 1906) (bankruptcy court not bound to follow mere
dictum of state court as to construction of state's exemption statute). See generally
1 COLLIER ff 6.03.
111. In re Friedrich, 100 Fed. 284 (7th Cir. 1900) ; In re Van Allsburg, 14 F.2d 672
(W.D. Mich. 1926). But see In re Wunder, 133 Fed. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1.905).
112. Bankruptcy Act § 7a(8) requires the bankrupt to claim exemptions in the sched-
ules filed in the bankruptcy proceedings. The schedule claiming exemptions, B-5, must
be filed with the petition if a voluntary proceeding or within 5 days after adjudication
if involuntary. 1 COLLIER ff 6.19. But see In re French, 231 Fed. 255 (W.D. N.Y. 1916)
(exemptions self-executing and there is no necessity for claiming them).
113. In re Gunzberger, 268 Fed. 673 (M.J. Pa. 1920) ; In re Gerber, 186 Fed. 693
(9th Cir. 1911) ; Moran v. King, 11.1 Fed. 730 (4th Cir. 1901). See also 1 COLLIER ff 6.19.
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exemptions, if any, are allowable but his findings must be approved in court 114
where the bankrupt or any individual creditor may contest his decision."1r
Upon final approval, the trustee returns exempt assets to the debtor. Under
Lockwood v. Exchange Bank,i" 6 title to exempt property remains in the
debtor, and the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over such assets extends only
to the determination of the exemption's validity.11T
Since the court is thus powerless to adjudicate conflicting interests in
exempt property," a creditor who has a valid lien upon property which is
generally exempt will be remitted to a state court to foreclose it.n 9 In cases
in which the creditor has no lien, but under state law may levy on generally
immune assets, he will lose his right to pursue them if the bankrupt is dis-
charged before a lien is obtained in a state court.' 20 In order to protect a
creditor in this predicament the Supreme Court held in Lockwood that the
bankruptcy court should delay discharge for a reasonable period.' 2 ' But this
does not completely protect the creditor, since the undischarged debtor may
still dissipate or damage the asset before perfection. 22 To avoid such conse-
114. Bankruptcy Act § 47a(6).
115. General Order 17 allows 10 days after the trustee files his report for such ob-
jection, unless further time is granted by the court. 11 U.S.C. order 17 (1952).
116. 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
117. Ibid. In Lockwood a creditor held a promissory note containing a written waiver
of the debtor's homestead exemption in a state which sanctioned waivers. The creditor
petitioned the bankruptcy court to set such portion of the exempt property aside to him
as necessary to satisfy his claim. The Supreme Court held that the petition should be
denied for lack of jurisdiction over exempt property, since such questions were for the
determination of the state court. See generally 1 COLLIER ff 6.05; Friebolin, Peculiar
Nature of Homestead Exemption: Their Disposition in Bankruptcy, 18 U. CINc. L. REv.
146 (1.949).
118. See note 117 supra; Novak v. O'Neal, 201 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Woodruff
v. Cheeves, 105 Fed. 601 (5th Cir. 1901) ; Note, 32 TEXAs L. REv. 222 (1953) ; Nadler,
Recent Developments in Bankraptcy, 27 REF. J. 121 (1953).
119. Duffy v. Tegeler, 19 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1927) ; In re Rabb, 21 F.2d 254 (N.D.
Tex. 1927) ; In re Vonhee, 238 Fed. 422, 428 (W.D. Wash. 1916) ; cf. Zapalac v. White,
9 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. Tex. 1934). But cf. In re Gordon, 115 Fed. 445 (D. Vt. 1902)
(bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims which pre-existed the acquisition
of the homestead since under state law the property was not exempt as to such claims).
120. Blake v. Alswager, 55 N.D. 776, 215 N.W. 549 (1927).
121. The meaning of "a reasonable period" in this context has never been litigated.
The 1938 amendment to Bankruptcy Act § 14(b), providing for automatic discharge in
the absence of timely objection, does not appear to have considered the Lockwood rule.
3 REmiNGTO N, BANKRUPTCY § 1317 (rev. ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as REMINGTON].
The bankruptcy court will not interfere with the efforts of creditors to perfect their
claims against exempt property in the state court. It re Bittle, 239 Fed. 191 (E.D. Pa.
1917). But see Bracewell v. Hughes, 214 Iowa 241, 242 N.W. 66 (1932) (unsecured
creditor cannot maintain a suit in a state court during the pendency of the bankruptcy
proceedings for the purpose of creating a lien but can only enforce a lien if one exists)
(dictum).
122. See In re Burden, 83 F. Supp. 416, 420 (D. Neb. 1949) (exempt truck damaged
after being set off to the bankrupt).
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quences some bankruptcy courts will order the trustee to retain temporary
possession of the property. 123 In addition, exempt property in the hands of
the trustee may be attached by the creditor' 24 or impounded by a state re-
ceiver until a lien is established.125
The Lockwood doctrine is unnecessarily injurious to the bankrupt. The
delay involved in postponing discharge and retaining judicial control pending
state-court litigation can seriously jeopardize his ability to support and re-
habilitate himself by withholding property to which he is entitled.' 26 The
creditor's suit may fail; and, in situations in which the debtor retains rights
in a portion of the property, his equity will be inaccessable until judicial sale
of the asset. Both parties are of course inconvenienced by the added expense
of a second litigation in another forum. 27 If the bankruptcy court were to
adjudicate all claims in exempt property and return to the debtor only those
assets which are totally immune to creditors, these difficulties would be
avoided. Once possessed of the property, it can expedite the litigation through
summary proceedings. 12 Furthermore, the bankruptcy docket is generally less
crowded.129 There are no policy objections to overruling Lockwood nor would
this course be entirely unprecedented. Bankruptcy courts frequently adjudicate
claims in property in which general creditors have no interest. 3 0 Moreover,
instances may be found in which the bankruptcy court currently administers
exempt property. If the property's value exceeds the state dollar limit, the
123. Where the exempt property is a fund of money in the hands of the trustee, the
court will order its retention to protect creditors. In re J. E. Maynard & Co., 183 Fed.
823 (N.D. Ga. 1910) ; In re Castleberry, 143 Fed. 1018 (N.D. Ga. 1905).
124. See Hukill-Hunter Co. v. Oliver, 43 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1930); B. F. Roden
Grocery Co. v. Bacon, 133 Fed. 515 (5th Cir. 1904) ; Dickens v. Breedlove, 34 Ga. App.
459, 129 S.E. 886 (1925).
125. See It re Meredith, 144 Fed. 230 (N.D. Ga. 1906); Bell v. Dawson Grocery
Co., 120 Ga. 628, 48 S.E. 150 (1904).
126. See, e.g., In re Urban, 136 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1943); Charnesky v. Urban, 245
Wis. 268, 14 N.W.2d 161 (1944) (ten months elapsed before title to an exempt car was
determined in a state court).
127. Cf. Stein v. Bostian, 133 F.2d 586, 589 (8th Cir. 1943) (requiring the enforce-
ment of tax claims on exempt property in state court despite recognition that it would
be more "convenient, expeditious and economical" to adjudicate such claims in bank-
ruptcy); Leiter v. Steinback, 184 F.2d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1950) (concurring opinion)
(suggesting remission to state court for adjudication only when issue is complicated).
128. Possession is the basis of bankruptcy courts' summary jurisdiction. Thompson v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 481 (1940). Since the trustee has possession of
exempt property, no reason appears, aside from Lockwood, for refusing summary juris-
diction in this, as in many other phases, of a bankruptcy proceeding. See 1 COLLIER
ff 6.06, at 814 n.1. Moreover, summary jurisdiction is often allowed although it is in
most instances not specifically conferred by the act. See 2 id. ff 23.04.
129. See MOORE, CASES ON DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 484-85 (1955).
130. Where, for example, the debtor's realty is subject to several security interests,
the court may sell the property, deduct the applicable costs, and distribute the proceeds
to the proper claimants. Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 336 U.S. 118,
130 (1949) ; Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931); see 6 REINGToN § 2583.
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court will sell the property and apportion the proceeds between the estate
and the bankrupt. 3 1 Finally, bankruptcy determination of all exempt-property
issues would not harm other creditors, since the applicable costs could be taxed
to the debtor and the litigating creditor.1 32
Interpretation of Section 6
The Definition of "Exempt"
Although section 6 provides that the Bankruptcy Act "shall not affect the
allowance of exemptions... which are prescribed by the laws of the [states],"
the act makes no effort to delineate what is an exemption under state law.
Furthermore, local law has no occasion to classify property in which creditors'
rights are restricted as "exempt" or "nonexempt," since normally the only
issue in state court is simply whether a particular creditor can reach the asset
in question. Nor do codifications of state statutes provide workable criteria,
since not all state legislation removing property from liability for the payment
of debts appears in sections labeled "exemptions."'1 33  A cognate problem
arises from state holdings that certain intangible rights are not subject to
levy and execution because they are not "property," since the question of
whether or not such immunity constitutes an "exemption" goes unasked and
unanswered. 34 These intangibles are generally freely transferable, and title
131. First Nat'l Bank v. Lanz, 202 Fed. 117 (5th Cir. 1913) ; see Bank of Nez Perce
v. Pindel, 193 Fed. 917 (9th Cir. 1912) (where bankrupt's exempt and nonexempt prop-
erty are inseparable court may sell the property and allot exemption from proceeds of
sale); In re Miller, 95 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1938) (same). If the bankrupt prefers his
exemption in cash rather than property, he may consent to sale by the bankruptcy court.
In re Cunningham, 15 F.2d 700 (E.D.S.C. 1926). When a debtor elects to have the court
sell exempt assets, the bankrupt only receives the amount produced by the assets on sale.
It re Moore, 274 Fed. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1921.).
Generally, when exempt property is sold the bankrupt must bear his proportional share
of the selling costs. It re Kane, 127 Fed. 552 (7th Cir. 1904). But see I re Hopkins,
103 Fed. 781 (D. Vt. 1930) (trustee and not bankrupt must pay for expenses of sale
where exempt and nonexempt property are inseparable and must be sold).
132. See cases cited note 130 szapra.
133. E.g., ILl. REV. STAT. ch. 22, § 49 (1958), dealing with supplementary procedures
to discover assets of a defendant against whom a judgment has been returned unsatisfied.
The section provides inter alia that a trust corpus established by a third party is not sub-
ject to execution. See Knight v. Gregory, 389 Ill. 554, 60 N.E.2d 399 (1945) (§ 49 does
not create an "exemption") ; 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 269 (federal courts would be bound if
state classified this interest as an exemption).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3536 (1953) (immunity of trust appears in section
dealing with trusts) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3538 (1955) (same). See generally 2 Scott,
TRuSTS § 152.1 (1956).
134. See Barclay v. Smith, 107 Ill. 349 (1883) (membership in the Chicago Board
of Trade not "property" and therefore not subject to judicial process); Thompson v.
Adams, 93 Pa. 55 (1879) (seat on Philadelphia Board of Brokers) ; Pancoast v. Gowen,
93 Pa. 66 (1879) (seat on Philadelphia stock exchange). See also Preston v. Ryan, 45
Mich. 174, 7 N.W. 819 (1881) (equity of redemption not liable to seizure); Garber
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to them will therefore pass to the trustee unless the state-granted freedom
from creditors qualifies as an "exemption."' 135
Bankruptcy courts avoid these definitional problems by ignoring the possi-
bility that other local provisions for immunity from creditors could be an
exemption, 36 or reach the same result more frankly by specifically holding
that for bankruptcy purposes an exemption must be so denominated by the
state.137 While these precedents provide a simple standard, it is by no means
clear that Congress intended operation of section 6 to be dependent solely
upon the language of the state legislatures. This ambiguity could be resolved
by legislative action on both federal and state levels. The Bankruptcy Act
could equate "exempt" property with property which under state law is not
subject to levy or execution sale by a general creditor. This, however, could
potentially result in the exemption of large and valuable assets which the state
legislature never intended to be exempt in bankruptcy. For example, some
statutes provide only a temporary immunity from creditors' process, allowing
execution after an elapsed time or the occurrence of some condition.1 38 Under
v. Bankers' Mortgage Co., 27 F.2d 609 (D. Kan. 1.928) (equity of redemption immune
under state law but not "exempt" in bankruptcy).
Under state law other property outside the traditional classification of exemptions is
immune from creditor's process. See, e.g., In re Kearns, 8 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1925) (since
tenancy by the entirety not subject to creditors of one spouse or transferable without con-
sent of the other spouse, it does not pass to trustee). The Kearns court equated tenancy
by the entirety to an exemption. Id. at 439 (dictum).
135. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) provides:
The trustee ... shall ... be vested by operation of law with the title of the bank-
rupt as of the date of the filing of the petition . . . except ... as . . .to property
which is held to be exempt, to all . . . (5) property, including rights of action,
which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred
or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him,
or otherwise seized ....
136. In several cases, property, although immune from creditors' process, was found
to pass to the trustee in bankruptcy under § 70(a) (5) because it was voluntarily alien-
able under state law, the court never discussing whether the local immunity constituted
an exemption. Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924) (membership in board of
trade) (dictum); Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1949) (equitable life in-
terest in trust) ; Pollak v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 233 Fed. 861 (8th Cir. 1916) (vested
remainder in a trust) ; Fisher v. Cushman, 103 Fed. 860 (1st Cir. 1900) (liquor license) ;
In re Evans, 235 Fed. 956 (D. Idaho 1916) (right of entry) ; Patrick v. Beatty, 202 N.C.
454, 163 S.E. 572 (1932) (trust of real estate).
137. See Page v. Edmunds, 187 U.S. 596 (1903) (stock exchange seat) ; Garber v.
Bankers' Mortgage Co., 27 F.2d 609 (D. Kan. 1928) (equity of redemption) ; In re T. C.
Burnett & Co., 201 Fed. 162 (E.D. Tenn. 1912) (growing crops).
138. Under Kansas law, for instance, a debtor's equity of redemption is immune from
creditors. IQN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3455 (1949). But the right to redeem only lasts
for eighteen months after the mortgage is foreclosed. KaN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3439
(1949) ; see Garber v. Bankers' Mortgage Co., 27 Fed. 609 (D. Kan. 1928) (refusing to
hold Kansas equity of redemption to be exempt). Contrca, Jones v. Wakeeney State Bank,
100 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1939) (not citing Garber).
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state law the creditor's right to resort to such property is only postponed, but
incorporation of these laws into bankruptcy would give the debtor total im-
munity since later execution would be precluded by discharge. However,
state legislatures could specifically provide which immunities shall not apply
in bankruptcy.
130
Obtaining an Exemption on the Eve of Bankruptcy
Since exemptions are typically framed in terms of specific property a
debtor is tempted to convert his nonexempt tangibles and his liquid wealth
into items within state exemption provisions on the eve of bankruptcy. 40
Once discharged, he can reconvert his newly acquired mule or molasses mill
into cash. Many states permit such conduct, holding that while "fraud" will
de-immunize otherwise exempt property, a purchase during insolvency for
the sole purpose of obtaining an exemption is not "fraudulent.' u 4 They
reason that the statutory language is absolute, 42 that exemptions ought to
be liberally construed,143 and that unsecured creditors, presumptively aware
of the possibility of conversion, can not be found to have detrimentally relied
upon any particular nonexempt property. 44 As might be expected, other
states hold that the transmutation of nonexempt assets into exempt propert
,
either while insolvent or with intent to defraud creditors, or both, estops the
debtor from successfully insulating the item from creditors' claims. 145
Since section 6 incorporates only those exemptions allowed by state law,
the bankruptcy courts follow the local rule in determining the effect of acquir-
ing exempt property shortly before bankruptcy. 46 Aside from adding still
more diversity to the Joseph's coat of bankruptcy exemptions, this doctrine
is difficult to apply since the state cases furnish unprofitable precedents-each
normally turns on its own facts.' 47 Furthermore, policy considerations for and
139. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-17 (1953).
140. See In re Hammonds, 198 Fed. 574 (E.D. Ky. 1912); 3 REMINGTON § 1278.
141, See Schwartz v. Seldon, 153 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945) ; In re Dudley, 72 F. Supp.
943 (S.D. Cal. 1947), aff'd, 166 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1948) ; O'Donnell v. Segar, 25 Mich.
367 (1872); Comstock v. Bechtel, 63 Wis. 656, 24 N.W. 465 (1885); Oglebay, Some
Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 22 REF. J. 41, 44 (1948).
Moreover, the conversion is not vulnerable as a "preference" or a "fraudulent con-
veyance." It re Driscoll, 142 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (preference) ; It rc Ham-
monds, 198 Fed. 574 (E.D. Ky. 1912) (fraudulent conveyance).
142. See Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 Fed. 73 (8th Cir. 1915).
143. See Forsberg v. Security State Bank, 15 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1926) ; Meigs v.
Dibble, 73 Mich. 101, 40 N.W. 935 (1888).
144. See It re Wilson, 123 Fed. 20 (9th Cir. 1903) ; In re Hammonds, 198 Fed. 574
(E.D. Ky. 1912).
145. See Riddell v. Shirley, 5 Cal. 488 (1855); Hollins, Burton & Co. v. Webb, 2
Shann. Cas. 581 (Tenn. 1877); 3 REMINGTON § 1278; cf. N.Y. INs. LAW § 166 (pro-
ceeds of insurance exempt except where intent to defraud creditors exists).
146. Shanks v. Hardin, 101 F.2d 1,77 (6th Cir. 1939).
147. Compare O'Donnell v. Segar, 25 Mich. 367 (1871) (conversion of nonexempt
property into exempt oxen for purpose of acquiring exemption not such fraud as will bar
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against exemption of newly acquired assets are often evenly balanced. Diffi-
culties could be largely avoided, however, if the act treated the acquisition
of exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy in essentially the same way
it treats "preferential" transfers or voidable judicial liens.' 48 Thus any claim
to an exemption in property acquired while the debtor is insolvent and within
four months prior to bankruptcy would be disallowed. This would presumably
allow the debtor those exempt assets which he owned when credit was still
being extended, but prevent him from defeating valid creditors' claims by
investing their funds in exempt assets. To prevent hardship, appropriate
exceptions to the general rule would allow the debtor to retain exempt assets
purchased to replace others, to provide the means of entrance into a new
livelihood, or to achieve any other purpose which the bankruptcy tribunal,
as a court of equity, finds justifiable.
The Effect of the Debtor's Domicile
Situations can arise in which the use by section 6 of "domicile" as a
determinant of the availability of state debtor relief will deprive individuals
of all exemptions. 49 The section allows exemptions of the state "wherein
they [bankrupts] have had their domicile for the six months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months
than in any other State ... ." Bankruptcy courts, however, may administer
the estates of insolvents who have either "had their principal place of business,
resided or had their domicile within their respective territorial jurisdiction...
or who ... have property within their jurisdictions."'u5  Accordingly, a person
who relinquishes state domicile to move to a foreign country is subject to a
bankruptcy proceeding if he has property or a place of business within a
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. But such a bankrupt would be denied any
exemption., 1 If the debtor has dependents who reside in the state where
proceedings are brought, the local policy of protecting a debtor's family from
exemption); and Comstock v. Bechtel, 63 Wis. 656, 24 N.W. 465 (1885) (conversion
while insolvent and with intent to defraud upheld), with Long v. Murphy, 27 Kan. 375
(1882) (insolvent debtor not allowed to exchange nonexempt goods purchased on credit
into exempt homestead) ; and Hollins, Burton & Co. v. Webb, 2 Shann. Cas. 581 (Tenn.
1877) (discharge of purchase money lien in order to claim exemption fraudulent to
creditors).
148. Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67(a).
149. "Domicile" as used in § 6 means more than residence. See In re Liberman, 44
F.2d 661 (S.D. Ala. 1.930) ; In re Grimes, 94 Fed. 800 (W.D.N.C. 1899).
Under § 6 of the original Act of 1898 a bankrupt would not be entitled to any state
exemptions if he had not had a domicile in one state for at least three months and a day.
30 Stat. 548. See 1 COLLIER ff 6.04, at 802 n.8.
150. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a) (1).
151. See 1 COLLIER ff 6.04, at 801 n.7; cf. In re Liberman, 44 F.2d 661 (S.D. Ala.
1930); In re Neidecker, 82 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1936) (dictum). See also Nadelmann,
Foreign and Domestic Creditors in Bankruptcy Proceedings. Remnants of Discrimina-
lion?, 91 U. PA. L. REv. 601 (1943).
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destitution is undercut. In addition, under state law exemptions are generally
available only to "residents."'1 52 Thus if a migrant was deemed to have no
residence in his "home" state (although it could be properly said to be his
domicile), he could be denied all exemptions in bankruptcy.15 3
Avoiding Liens Upon and Transfers of Exrempt Property
The Bankruptcy Act provides in several sections for the recovery of prop-
erty which the debtor transferred or surrendered to a particular creditor, or to a
third party, in order to defeat the claims of all his creditors. Without explanation
or apparent justification, these provisions treat the recovery of exempt property
inconsistently. Exempt property is specifically excluded from the reach of section
67(d), the act's "fraudulent conveyance" provision, 154 which enables the
trustee to avoid a transfer if, inter alia, it is made for less than adequate con-
sideration or with actual intent to defraud creditors.1m Similarly, the courts
have uniformly held that a transfer of exempt property to a favored creditor
on account of an antecedent debt is not "preferential" and thus can not be
retrieved by the trustee under section 60.156 In contrast, the trustee utilizing
152. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(18) (1947); MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 93-5813 (1947); Na. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1556 (1948).
If the bankrupt is not a resident at the precise date his exemption is determined his
claim will be denied, even if he was a resident before and since that date. In re O'Hara,
162 Fed. 325 (M.D. Pa. 1908).
153. Although research reveals no cases where a bankrupt has a domicile but not a
residence, the possibility has been recognized. See Seccomb v. Bovey, 135 Minn. 353, 355,
160 N.W. 1018, 1019 (1917). Traveling salesmen or seamen might fit into this category.
But see 1 BEALE, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS § 10.12 (1935) (citing two cases for the proposition
that residence in exemption statutes may mean "domicile").
154. Bankruptcy Act § 67(d) (1), modeled on the UIFoRm FRAUDULENT CONVEY-
ANCE Acr, provides that "'property' of a debtor shall include only his nonexempt prop-
erty." Compare the use of the term property in the definition of insolvency in § 1(19),
which includes both exempt and nonexempt assets.
The UNIFORm FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AcT varies slightly. Section 1 provides that
"'assets' of a debtor means property not exempt from liability for his debts. To the ex-
tent that any property is liable for any debts of the debtor, such property shall be included
in his assets." Although no case appears to have so held, the latter sentence would seem
to enable a creditor to whom property is not exempt to invoke the act. Cf. Peoples State
Bank v. Karlen, 44 S.E. 82, 182 N.W. 531 (1921) (implying that the transfer of a home-
stead which exceeded in value the statutory maximum could be fraudulent to creditors).
The Uniform Act has been adopted by twenty states, 9B U.L.A. 10 (Supp. 1958).
155. See First Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 283 Minn. 160, 47 N.W.2d 764 (1951) (con-
veyance of homestead under the Uniform Act cannot be set aside as fraudulent, even
though debtor conveying property intends to defraud his creditors).
The general rule that a conveyance of exempt property which if nonexempt would
be fraudulent can not be set aside rests on the theory that since title to exempt property
can not vest in the trustee and the property is not an asset of the bankrupt estate, general
creditors have no concern over its disposition. Sieg v. Greene, 225 Fed. 955 (8th Cir.
1915).
156. In contrast to Bankruptcy Act § 67(d), which specifically excludes exempt
property from its scope, see note 154 supra, § 60(a) defines a preference as the transfer
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section 70(e), which permits him to set aside transfers voidable by any
creditor under state law, may therefore defeat both fraudulent and preferential
transfers of exempt property, since some states treat these conveyances no
differently than conveyances of nonexempt property, reasoning that the debtor
has waived the property's immunity by his conduct. 157 Finally, section 67(a),
which dissolves judicial liens obtained on the property of an insolvent within
four months of bankruptcy, can furnish the means for reacquisition by the
debtor (or perhaps the trustee)'5 of generally exempt assets.' 59
Section 67(a)
The obvious purpose of section 67(a) is to foster equality of distribution
among general creditors by setting aside liens on nonexempt property ob-
tained in a creditors' race. Therefore the section sets aside for the benefit
of the estate any lien which meets its requirements.' 60 But shortly after the
act was passed, the Supreme Court held, in Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Hall,161
that it might also be used for the debtor's benefit to avoid a lien upon exempt
property, although a race to attach exempt property is generally impossible.
Hall, an employee of the defendant railroad, was domiciled and employed in
Nebraska, where wages were exempt. While temporarily in Iowa, where
wages were subject to creditors' claims and Nebraska's exemptions not recog-
nized, two Nebraska creditors served Hall and garnished the railroad. 62
While the Iowa action was pending, Hall was adjudicated a bankrupt in
Nebraska and sued the railroad there to recover his back pay. 63 Finding a
of "any of the property of a debtor . . . while insolvent and within four months" of
bankruptcy to satisfy an antecedent debt. See note 179 infra. Nonetheless, the courts have
refused to avoid the preferential transfer of exempt property on the same theory that
they apply to fraudulent conveyances. See note 155 supra and cases cited in note 182 infra.
See also Huntington v. Baskerville, 192 Fed. 813 (8th Cir. 1911); Vitzthum v. Large,
162 Fed. 685 (N.D. Iowa 1908) (dictum).
157. See 1 COLLIER ff 6.11; Annot., 161 A.L.R. 1009, 1020 (1946) (collecting cases).
15S. See text at notes 172-73, 190-94 infra.
159. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 51.1 (1913), 1 VA. L. Rav. 64
(1913), 14 COLUM. L. REv. 64 (1914). See also Note, 40 VA. L. REv. 83 (1954).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(a) (1) provides:
Every lien against the property of a person obtained by attachment, judgment,
levy, or other legal or equitable process or proceedings within four months before
the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this Act by or against such
person shall be deemed null and void (a) if at the time when such lien was ob-
tained such person was insolvent ....
160. 4 COLLIER ff 67.01.
161. 229 U.S. 511, 515 (1913).
162. Id. at 511-13.
163. See the opinion below, Hall v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 88 Neb. 20, 128 N.W. 645
(1910) (refusing to recognize the Iowa judgments against Hall). The Nebraska court
did not think that such a holding imposed a double liability on the railroad since the
Iowa judgments were a nullity. But if the railroad had notified the debtor of the pending
garnishment proceeding, and upon his default, raised as a defense to garnishment his
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"general policy" in the act to enable the debtor to secure a discharge and
"start afresh with the property set apart to him as exempt,"' 64 the Supreme
Court held that the Iowa judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit
since section 67(a)(1) nullified the garnishment lien.' 65
In the 1938 revisions of the Bankruptcy Act, Congress codified Hall by
providing in section 67(a) (3) that any property discharged from a lien shall
pass "to the trustee or debtor as the case may be."'u 6 Presumably, Congress
intended exempt property to pass to the bankrupt and nonexempt to the
trustee.1 67 So applied, 67(a) gives the debtor a windfall. Under the law of
some states, favored creditors, such as purchase-money lenders, tort claimants
and materialmen may obtain a judicial lien upon exempt property. 0 8 The
avoidance of these liens for the benefit of the debtor allows him to obtain a
larger exemption than is authorized by the state. 69 Although the Hall case,
exemption rights, it is doubtful that Hall could recover from the railroad any money
already paid to the creditors. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) ; In re Beals, 116
Fed. 530 (D. Ind. 1902).
164. 229 U.S. at 515.
165. Actually, the court relied on the predecessor of § 67(a) (1). See 4 CoIER
67.03, at 48 n.2.
166. Bankruptcy Act § 67(a) (3) provides:
The property affected by any lien deemed null and void under the provisions of
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision a shall be discharged from such lien,
and such property . . . shall pass to the trustee or debtor, as the case may be,
except that the court may on due notice order any such lien to be preserved for
the benefit of the estate ....
For the legislative history see note 172 infra; HANNA & MA&AC HLAN, THE BANK-
RUPTcy AcT 96 (5th ed. 1953).
Bankruptcy Act § 67(a) (4) also codified Hall by providing: "The court shall have
summary jurisdiction of any proceeding by the trustee or debtor, as the case may be, to
hear and determine the rights of any parties under this subdivision a." Prior to § 67
(a) (4), the trustee, absent consent of a lienholder or possession of the res, could only
bring a plenary suit under 67(a) in a court where the bankrupt might have prosecuted
the action if bankruptcy bad not intervened. Bankruptcy Act § 23(b); see 4 CoLLIEa
if 67.18. The Supreme Court also permitted the debtor to assert the invalidity of a lien on
exempt property in such a proceeding. See Fischer v. Pauline Oil & Gas Co., 309 U.S.
294, 301 (1940). A previous case had denied this right, thus leaving the debtor without
a remedy if the trustee refused to claim on his behalf. Connell v. Walker, 291 U.S. 1
(1934) ; see it re Burden, 83 F. Supp. 416 (D. Neb. 1949) (discussing the history of
§ 67(a) (4)) ; Oglebay, Some Developments In Bankruptcy Law, 24 REF. J. 24, 25 (1950).
167. See 4 COLLIER if 67.18.
168. See text at notes 77-83 supra. To the extent creditors claims are not discharge-
able the debtor would not receive a windfall by the avoidance of a lien.
169. See Gray v. Arnot, 31 N.D. 461, 154 N.W. 268 (1915) (lien of purchase-money
lender avoided) ; McMains v. Cunningham, 214 Iowa 300, 242 N.V. 106 (1930) (lien of
tort claimant) ; Cavanaugh v. Fenley, 94 Minn. 505, 103 N.W. 711 (1905) (garnishment
lien).
Mechanics' and materialmen's liens are ordinarily statutory, not judicial, 4 COLLIER
if 67.22. They are therefore insulated from avoidance under § 67(a) (1). Bankruptcy Act
§§ 67(b), (c); see Wallace T. Bruce, Inc. v. Najarian, 249 Minn. 99, 81 N.W.2d 282
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on its own facts, achieved the salutary result of preventing an exemption from
being defeated because suit was brought in another forum, which failed to
apply the exemption statutes of the debtor's domicile,170 its extension to avoid
judicial liens on exempt property generally subverts the basic bankruptcy
scheme of incorporating whatever allowance state law provides.1 71
Liens upon exempt property are not invariably set aside to the bankrupt,
however, for an exception to section 67(a) (3)'s provision that property which
has been released from a lien "shall pass to the trustee or the debtor, as the
case may be" states !hat the court may upon due notice order the lien "to be
preserved for the benefit of the estate. 172 Implementation of this language
would seem to nullify the Hall doctrine. When a lien is preserved for the
estate, the general creditors obtain property which they would otherwise never
reach. This advantage is obtained at the expense of either the lienor or the
debtor, who has an expectation engendered by the Hall doctrine. Although
the exception clause has rarely been invoked,' 78 it, like Hall itself, is contrary
to the act's basic policy of incorporating state exemptions.
(1957) (mechanics' lien upon homestead not a judicial lien even though it does not arise
until an in personam judgment is obtained and docketed). The availability of a statutory
procedure, however, does not generally preclude a mechanic's or materialman's lien from
arising judicially. See Moffitt v. Denniston & Partridge Co., 229 Iowa 570, 294 N.W. 731
(1940) (recognizing a judicial lien for work done and materials furnished on a home-
stead since statute of limitations had run on statutory lien).
If within four months of bankruptcy a lien is acquired on nonexempt property and
the asset attains exempt status when bankruptcy ensues, the debtor may set it aside under§§ 67(a) (1), (3). In re Burden, 83 F. Supp. 416 (D. Neb. 1949) (attached truck sub-
sequently used as tool of a new trade) ; Gregory Co. v. Cale, 115 Minn. 503, 133 N.W. 75
(1911) (lien acquired after bankruptcy on exempt property for a debt contracted prior
to an enactment exempting it).
Arguably, the act's use of § 67(a) (1) to avoid liens for the debtor's benefit, while
failing to similarly recover fraudulent and preferential transfers of exempt property, can
be supported in terms of a distinction between involuntarily suffering a lien and volun-
tarily transferring property. But the distinction vanishes when a debtor who could dis-
charge the underlying debt by payment allows a lien to attach.
170. See text accompanying notes 160-65 supra.
171. See 3 REmINGTON § 1290.
Occasionally the Hall doctrine has been ignored. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 216 Fed.
989 (M.D. Pa. 1914) ; Blake v. Alswager, 55 N.D. 776, 215 N.W. 549 (1927). Moreover,
it does not avoid liens acquired by contract or waiver since § 67(a) (1) applies only to
judicial liens. See In re Goldberg, 254 Fed. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1918) ; Equitable Credit Co.
v. Miller, 164 Ga. 49, 137 S.E. 771 (1927).
172. Bankruptcy Act § 67(a) (3). This language's purpose was the prevention of the
avoidance of a lien under § 67(a) (1) accruing to the benefit of a junior creditor. 4 COL-
LIER ff 67.16.
173. Although the clause may be more frequently utilized than the reports indicate,
there are only a few reported cases. See Hemsell v. Rabb, 29 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1929)
(preserving a creditor's lien obtained prior to debtor's acquisition of the encumbered
homestead for the estate, since under state law debtor was only entitled to the equity
above such a lien); In re Porter, 3 F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Fla. 1933) (same). In these
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Finally, section 67(a)'s application is inconsistent with Lockwood v. Ex-
change Bank.174 Under Lockwood the bankruptcy court will withhold dis-
charge in order to give a creditor sufficient time to perfect a lien on exempt
property in a state court. Since 67(a) will only avoid a prebankruptcy lien,
a wise creditor who is able to reach exempt property will delay attachment
until after bankruptcy proceedings have begun, and thereby take advantage
of Lockwood. Furthermore, if a court attempted to follow both Lockwood
and Hall, the result would be a senseless merry-go-round. The court would
be obliged first to avoid a prebankruptcy lien for the benefit of the debtor,
and then delay discharge to allow the creditor to reobtain his lien.17 r
Section 67(d)
In contrast to 67(a)'s inconsistent application, section 67(d) has never
been used to recover, for either the bankrupt or the estate, exempt property
conveyed in situations which would render a similar transfer of nonexempt
assets "fraudulent" under the act.' 78  The goal of protecting the bankrupt
or his general creditors would not require the opposite result. When a debtor
voluntarily transfers exempt property for inadequate consideration, he pre-
sumably feels that the transfer is to his benefit.1' 7 And so long as the asset
is, in fact, exempt from their claims, general creditors are no more prejudiced
than if he had retained it."'
s
instances, however, § 67(a) (3) was not used for its supposed purpose-prevention of a
lien being avoided for the benefit of a junior creditor. See note 172 supra.
For other instances when a lien on exempt property is preserved for the benefit of
the estate, see 1 COLLIER ff 6.12, at 847 n.6.
174. 190 U.S. 294 (1903), discussed in text at notes 116-21 supra.
175. Cf. Northern Shoe Co. v. Cecka, 22 N.D. 631, 135 N.W. 177 (1912) (creditor
not estopped from obtaining a new lien on exempt property after bankruptcy proceedings
had commenced, even though he had abandoned enforcement of a prebankruptcy lien
which could have been avoided under § 67(a) (1)).
176. See notes 154-55 supra and accompanying text, stating the general rule. When,
however, property transferred or encumbered exceeds in value the amount of the ex-
emption allowed, the transfer or encumbrance is voidable to the amount of such excess.
First Nat'l Bank v. Lanz, 202 Fed. 117 (5th Cir. 1913). Further, when in a conveyance
both exempt and nonexempt property are commingled, it is voidable as to the nonexempt
property. Gylling v. Kjergaard, 293 Fed. 676 (8th Cir. 1923).
177. Arguably, when a debtor has made a fraudulent transfer of exempt property, he
has surrendered any protection to which his family would be entitled. However, this argu-
ment goes too far. Since the property is exempt, the debtor should be able to utilize it
in ways which benefit him. For example, he might have conveyed a valuable homestead
for $1 to his son to make the son independent. Such a conveyance has a legitimate family
motive which ought to be recognized by the courts. Likewise, a debtor may execute a
conveyance of exempt property, otherwise fraudulent, to establish good relations with a
creditor. If the debtor expects to receive a benefit for himself and his family, the law
should not frown on such a transfer.




Presently, bankruptcy courts also leave preferential transfers of exempt
property undisrupted. But arguments can be advanced that section 60 is the
most proper path to the bankrupt's recovery of such propertyYZ9 Situations
can be easily imagined in which an honest debtor transfers exempt assets to
a particularly insistent creditor in order to satisfy an antecedent debt. This
may well have been done in order to deter the creditor from initiating bank-
ruptcy proceedings, with the hope that once the obligation was satisfied
economic stability would be revived.1 0 When the debtor's expectation is de-
feated in the event, he finds himself in liquidation without the cushion of his
exemptions. To be sure, using section 60 to recover property for the bank-
rupt's benefit may be a quasi-charitable intervention on behalf of an indivi-
dual who might have protected himself and his family by more prudent be-
havior. But a creditor's insistence may be effectively irresistible if the alter-
(8th Cir. 1915) ; Bohannon v. Clark, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1710, 78 S.W. 479 (Ct. App. 1904);
Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla. 271, 184 So. 865 (1938).
An exception to the harshness of the general rule might be advisable. Where the
debtor can demonstrate that a creditor coerced him into making a fraudulent transfer,
by threatening bankruptcy, for instance, the transfer of exempt property should be re-
covered for his benefit. However, a number of obstacles must be overcome if this course
is to be followed. Section 67(d) expressly excludes its application to exempt property.
A more flexible approach might allow the trustee to intervene when equity requires.
Another difficulty is presented by the rule that exemptions are determined at the time of
the petition. White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310 (1924). Thus, if the debtor has fraudulently
deeded exempt property prior to bankruptcy, he would not own it at the date of petition.
See In re Wishnefsky, 181 Fed. 896 (D.N.J. 1910). If the fraudulent deed is considered
void ab initio, however, this conceptual hurdle could be overcome. See Stewart v. Black,
143 Ore. 291, 22 P.2d 336 (1933). Finally, the provisio to § 6 which disallows an ex-
emption out of transfers avoided under the act, see text at note 190 infra, would have to
be made discretionary rather than mandatory.
179. To effect a "preferential transfer" within the meaning of § 60(a), the debtor
must (1) transfer property (2) to or for the benefit of a creditor (3) for or on account
of an antecedent debt (4) while insolvent and (5) within four months of bankruptcy. If
the requirements of § 60(a) are met, the trustee is authorized in § 60(b) to avoid the
transfer, providing that "the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby or his agent
. has, at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
is insolvent."
Since § 60(a), unlike § 67(d), does not exclude exempt property, it could be applied
to such property. However, an amendment to the proviso of § 6 would be necessary. See
note 190 infra. The allowance of an exemption out of recovered preferentially transferred
property is also subject to the conceptual objection that exemptions are determined as of
the petition date. See note 178 suepra. See also In re White, 109 Fed. 635 (W.D. Mo.
1901).
180. A preference does not require any intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.
3 COLLFR ff 60.03; see In re Armory and Leeds, 1 Fed. Cas. 788 (No. 336c) (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1844) (preference which was procured by threats to bring action on their claims
upset for general creditors) ; Rison v. Knapp, 20 Fed. Cas. 835 (No. 11861) (E.D. Ark.
1868) (preference upset for general creditors even though made under pressure and with
expectation that all debts would eventually be paid).
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native is bankruptcy, and the basic theory behind discharging a debtor with
sufficient assets to start afresh is help to those who could not help them-
selves.'" Nor would the debtor's recovery of preferentially conveyed exempt
property be unjust to either the general creditors or the transferee. General
creditors ordinarily have no interest in such property, 8 2 and since the trans-
feree could not retain similarly conveyed nonexempt property, he should
not be benefited because the debtor relinquished assets which, according to
state policy, are necessary for his support and rehabilitation. The costs of re-
covery, however, should be borne by the debtor rather than the general credi-
tors.183 Thus, the exempt property could be returned to the trustee, who
would recover his expenses therefrom before relinquishing it to the bank-
rupt. 8 4
Section 70(e) and the Proviso to Section 6
Related problems are raised by section 70(e) which enables the trustee to
assert the rights of a creditor under state law. Generally, 70(e) is unavail-
ing in the recovery of exempt property, since most states hold such a con-
veyance is neither fraudulent nor preferential., A few states, however, allow
creditors to attack transfers of exempt assets reasoning that the transferee is
not entitled to the debtor's exemption as a defense.'86 In those instances
where exempt property was recovered, the bankruptcy courts, purporting to
follow state law answered the question of its ultimate disposition different-
181. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511 (1913).
182. See Schwartz v. Holzman, 69 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1934); Baumbaugh v. Los An-
geles Morris Plan Co., 30 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1929) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Lanz, 202 Fed.
117 (5th Cir. 1913).
183. The law would be a mockery, and permit a party to take advantage of his own
wrong, if after having transferred his property . . . and compelling the trustee in
bankruptcy, at the expense of the estate, to engage in protracted litigation ... and
recover the proceeds of the property . . . the bankrupt could . . . come in and
[claim his exemption] ....
In re White, 109 Fed. 635, 637 (W.D. Mo. 1901).
Even though the debtor pays the administrative costs, general creditors may be prej-
udiced. Since the transferee will become a general creditor after the avoidance, the same
estate will be divided among a larger amount of claims.
184. Cf. In re Collier, 93 Fed. 191. (W.D. Tenn. 1899) (where no assets are in the
estate, administrative costs may be paid out of exempt property) ; Ilk re Kane, 127 Fed.
552 (7th Cir. 1904) (where bankrupt demands exemption in cash instead of property
and property is sold, bankrupt must bear proportionate share of expenses of sale). Contra,
Dunlap Hardware Co. v. Huddleston, 167 Fed. 433 (5th Cir. 1909).
185. See Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla. 271, 184 So. 865 (1938) (no fraudulent convey-
ance of exempt property) ; Jackson v. Jetter, 160 Iowa 571, 142 N.W. 431 (1913) (same) ;
Kleinert v. Lefkowitz, 271 Mich. 79, 259 N.W. 871 (1935) (same) ; Bank of Mendon
v. Mell, 185 Mo. App. 510, 172 S.W. 484 (1914) (no preference of exempt property);
Herring v. Whitford, 119 Neb. 725, 230 N.W. 665 (1930) (same).
186. See Bandy v. Taylor Iron Works & Supply Co., 177 Ga. 455, 170 S.E. 368
(1933) ; Tilton v. Sanborn, 59 N.H. 290 (1879).
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ly.'8 7 Some, mindful of the welfare of the bankrupt and his family and wary
of allowing a windfall to the general creditors, allowed title to revest in him,'88
while others accorded the property to the trustee, conceiving of the transfer
as the debtor's abandonment of his interest. 8 9
To resolve this conflict and to prevent a bankrupt from obtaining an exemp-
tion in property recovered by the trustee,'9 0 the 1938 revision added a pro-
viso to section 6 which supersedes state law by disallowing any claim to an
exemption "out of the property which a bankrupt transferred or concealed
and which is recovered or the transfer of which is avoided under this Act for
the benefit of the estate . . . ." Despite its broad language, the scope of the
proviso appears to be limited. 191 Arguably, it could overrule the Hall doctrine
(allowing the debtor to recover property freed from a lien by section 67(a)),
for the Bankruptcy Act's 'definition of a "transfer" includes the sufferance of
a lien.' 0 2 Congress apparently did not intend this result, for it contemporan-
eously codified Hall. Moreover, the proviso does not attempt to alter the prior
rule that sections 67(d) and 60 do not comprehend exempt property, or to
expand section 70(e)'s use of state law to similarly set aside fraudulent or
preferential transfers. 193 Therefore, it provides nothing more than a uniform
rule of bankruptcy distribution in those few states where creditors may set
aside conveyances of exempt property.194
187. Compare Arbogast v. Gottfried, 58 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1932) (allowing an ex-
emption in a recovered preference because Ohio law allows a debtor to claim an ex-
emption out of a recovered fraudulent conveyance) ; and It re Arnall, 285 Fed. 654 (N.D.
Ga. 1923) (dictum), with Hyman v. Stern, 43 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1930) (no exemption
allowed out of recovered property fraudulently concealed).
188. See In re Falconer, 110 Fed. 111 (8th Cir. 1901) (preference) ; Cox v. Wilder,
6 Fed. Cas. 684 (No. 3308) (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1872) (fraudulent conveyance); Vaughn v.
Vaughn, 262 Ky. 181, 89 S.W.2d 884 (1936); Kleinert v. Lefkowitz, 271 Mich. 79, 259
N.W. 871 (1935).
189. In re Wishnefsky, 181 Fed. 896 (D.N.J. 1910); In re White, 109 Fed. 635 (W.
D. Mo. 1901). See also In re Denson, 195 Fed. 857 (N.D. Ala. 1912) (exemption not
allowed in fraudulently concealed assets).
190. H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1937) ; see In re Grisanti, 58 F.
Supp. 646 (W.D. Ky. 1945) (Bankruptcy Act now provides uniform rule).
191. The language of the proviso would indicate its application to conveyances in
"good" as well as "bad faith." Thus, it would deny an exemption even when a general
assignment for the benefit of all creditors was set aside under the Act. See 3 REmINGTON
§ 1276. But see 1. COLMER fI 6.11 (criticizing this possible result).
192. Bankruptcy Act § 1(30). As far as can be determined, this argument has never
been raised as a defense to the avoidance of a judicial lien on exempt property under
§ 67(a). See 3 REmINGTON § 1277.
193. See 1 CoiLzIER f 6.11. See also Annot., 161 A.L.R. 1009, 1013 n.1 (1946).
194. Some courts have avoided reaching any problem under the proviso by holding
that a transfer of exempt property results in a waiver by the debtor of any exemption
rights in the property. See Gardner v. Johnson, 195 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1952), 26 So. CAL
L. Rzv. 87. But see Negin v. Salomon, 151 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1945) (transfer of part of
exempt property does not result in waiver of exemption in rest). There are, of course,
other circumstances under which the trustee may recover exempt property even though
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The effect of the 1938 amendment to section 6 is further diluted by an un-
explained exception clause, which provides that "where the voided transfer
was made by way of security only and the property recovered is in excess of
the amount secured thereby, such allowance [an exemption] may be made
out of such excess." Although this language has not yet been construed,0 0
it may seriously undercut the proviso's purpose of recovering for the estate
fraudulently or preferentially conveyed exempt property. Assume, for ex-
ample, that a debtor mortgages a $5000 homestead to secure a $500 loan. If
the transaction constitutes a fraudulent conveyance under state law, the trustee
can set is aside via section 70(e). But if the mortgagee lacks fraudulent in-
tent he will normally be entitled to repayment out of the property,196 and the
debtor, according to the exception clause, will receive the $4500 balance, thus
leaving nothing for the general creditors. A similar result obtains if the mort-
gage was a preferential transfer, made to secure an antecedent debt, except
that the estate will be entitled to receive $500 from the recovered property,
the bankrupt the excess, and the mortgagee will have to claim as a general
creditor.197 Since the language of the exemption is permissive the debtor's
rights thereunder depend upon judicial discretion, but neither the statute nor
its legislative history provides any standards to guide the courts.
198
The statutory scheme, created by section 70(e), the proviso to section 6,
and its exception, neither faithfully incorporates state exemption policy nor
he is unable to set aside a fraudulent or preferential transfer of exempt property under
state or federal law. See, e.g., Ii re Coddington, 126 Fed. 891 (M.D. Pa. 1904) (sur-
render by the transferee) ; 1 COLLIER ff 6.11; cf. 3 REMINGTON § 1276.5 (where the bank-
rupt conceals nonexempt property which is not recovered and the value of such property
is proved, it may be charged against any allowable exemptions).
195. In the only two cases involving a security transfer of exempt property in excess
of the secured debt, the courts have ignored the exception clause and disallowed any ex-
emption. In re Grisanti, 58 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. Ky. 1945) (fraudulent transfer) ; In re
Ragozzino, 38 F. Supp. 53 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (bad faith on part of bankrupt in failing
to list exempt asset in his initial schedule).
196. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AcT § 9(2) provides: "A purchaser who
without actual fraudulent intent has given less than a fair consideration for the convey-
ance or obligation, may retain the property or obligation as security for repayment"
197. A requirement of a preference under state law is reasonable belief of the trans-
feror's insolvency by the transferee. If the transfer qualifies as a preference, the transferee
retains nothing. See 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 390 (rev.
ed. 1940).
198. The purpose of the exception to the proviso is ambiguous. One of the authorities,
who testified at the hearings, states: "The exception . . . was intended to give a bank-
rupt the benefit of any excess recovered over the amount of the debt secured; to the ex-
tent of such excess, the estate is not deprived of the property and thus has not been
harmed." WEisTEiN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 1938, at 30 (1938). This explanation
apparently ignores the fact that the estate ordinarily recovers the amount of the debt, in
which the general creditors have no greater interest than in the excess and as to which
they have equally "not been harmed."
HANNA & McLACHLAN, THE BANKRUPTCY AcT 19 (5th ed. 1953), suggest that the
exception should not be applied where the security conveyance was fraudulent.
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provides a truly uniform bankruptcy rule for recovering transfers of exempt
property. The former goal is defeated, because the bankrupt's right to exempt
property recovered under section 70(e) is governed by section 6, and there-
fore largely depends upon whether or not the avoided transaction was a se-
curity agreement, while the states usually deny this right.199 Conversely, uni-
formity is not achieved, because section 6's proviso is with few exceptions 200
operative only in those instances when state law, as incorporated by section
70(e), is controlling. A uniform bankruptcy rule, with no ties to state law,
appears desirable. Perhaps the most satisfactory solution is the previously-
suggested amendments of sections 60 and 67(d),201 followed by the restric-
tion of 70(e)'s operation in exempt-property cases 202 and the repeal of the
proviso to 6. Thus, transfers of exempt property shortly before bankruptcy
would be normally undisturbed, although the asset would be returned to the
debtor under section 60 according to the merits of the particular case and
under 67(d) when the "fraudulent" conveyance is the result of coercion. In
this manner, the interests of the debtor and both general and special creditors
will be equitably balanced throughout the act.
The Ideal Lien Creditor and Exempt Property
Section 70(c), vesting in the trustee all property of the debtor upon which
a creditor (real or imaginary) could have obtained a lien at the date of
bankruptcy,2 0 3 enables general creditors to strip the bankrupt of virtually
any exemption he may be entitled to under the state law. The potency of this
provision was dramatically demonstrated in the Ninth Circuit case of Sams ell
v. Straub.20 4 There, section 70(c) defeated a California homestead exemption
which no existing creditor could have successfully challenged. In California,
199. Even in the few states which allow a tainted conveyance of exempt property
to be set aside, the action is almost invariably for the benefit of creditors and not the
debtor. See Bandy v. Taylor Iron Works & Supply Co., 177 Ga. 455, 170 S.E. 368
(1933); Tilton v. Sanborn, 59 N.H. 290 (1879). But cf. Roig v. Schults, 42 Ohio St.
165 (1884) (exemption allowed a debtor after creditor set aside the transfer).
200. See note 194 supra.
201. See notes 176-84 supra and accompanying text.
202. Denying application of § 70(e) to exempt property will give the trustee less
power than creditors have in those states allowing an attack on tainted transfers of
exempt property. See text at note 186 supra. Such a result is justified in view the
desirability of leaving uncoerced transfers alone. See text at notes 176-84 supra.
203. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c) provides:
. . . The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into possession or con-
trol of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien
by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested
as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then hold-
ing a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually
exists.
204. 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952), 31 TEXAs L.
Rnv. 64 (1952).
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as in many other states, a householder has no homestead exemption rights
without filing.20 5 Although under California law he can generally record his
homestead any time before judicial sale,208 a judgment creditor whose lien
is docketed prior to recordation will prevail.2 7 The bankrupt in Samsell had
not recorded prior to the petition, and therefore the trustee, wearing the hat
of a non-existent judgment creditor who had docketed his lien, successfully
defeated the exemption.2 0 8 Although no cases appear to have carried section
70(c) to its logical extreme,20 9 there is no reason why the trustee could not
defeat virtually every exemption by playing the role of a creditor as to whom
the property is non-exempt. Many states, for example, provide that exempt
property is available to a purchase-money lender.2 1° Presumably the trustee
could thus obtain title to the asset. Similarly, wage exemptions could be de-
205. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1262 (1954); see Comment, 26 CALni. L. Rav. 241
(1938).
State requirements for recordation of homesteads vary. In most states filing of home-
stead declarations is not necessary. Annot., 145 A.L.R. 501, 502 (1943). In states requir-
ing the filing of a homestead declaration, one type of statute requires declaration to be
made prior to levy. See In re Youngstrom, 153 Fed. 98 (8th Cir. 1907) (Colo.). In
these states the debtor must have filed his declaration prior to the petition in bankruptcy
in order to obtain the exemption. White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310 (1924), 25 COLUm. L.
REv. 492 (1925). A second type of statute allows a debtor to keep his homestead by filing a
declaration anytime prior to the execution sale. See Georgouses v. Gillen, 24 F.2d 292
(9th Cir. 1.928). In these states, a declaration after adjudication in bankruptcy will suffice.
Myers v. Matley, 318 U.S. 622 (1943), 43 COLUM. L. Rav. 227. Finally, several states
allow a homestead to be claimed even after execution sale. See North Dakota v. Schafer,
131 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1942) ; In re Carl, 38 F. Supp. 414 (W.D. Ark. 1941).
206. In re Curmar Mfg. Co., 91 F. Supp. 647, 648 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (under California
law a lien of execution is not sufficient to defeat a declaration made after levy of execu-
tion and before sale), aff'd on other grounds sub nonr. Sampsell v. Straub, 189 F.2d 379,
rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 927 (1952).
207. Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1951); Schuler-Knox Co. v. Smith,
62 Cal. App. 2d 86, 144 P.2d 47 (Dist CL App. 1943).
208. This result was reached on rehearing. Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952). In its original decision, the Ninth Circuit
refused to apply § 70(c) on the grounds that under local law the only lien which would
defeat the declaration was one obtained by docketing an in personam judgment, and that
such a lien was not obtained by "legal or equitable proceedings." Sampsell v. Straub, 189
F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1951) ; see 50 MicH. L. Rav. 925 (1952) (criticizing the result) ; 27
N.Y.U.L. Ray. 146 (1952); 100 U. PA. L. Rv. 453 (1951).
209. Only recently have courts begun employing § 70(c) to defeat exemptions. See
England v. Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956) (discussed in note 216 infra).
Section 70(c) has also been employed to achieve results similar to those under § 67
(a). The Seventh Circuit hypothesized an "ideal" creditor to defeat an unrecorded mort-
gage on exempt property valid between the bankrupt-mortgagor and mortgagee and re-
turned the property to the debtor. In re Urban, 136 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1943). Subsequent-
ly, however, the state court mitigated this result by awarding the exempt property to the
mortgagee. Charnesky v. Urban, 245 Wis. 268, 14 N.W.2d 161 (1944).
210. See notes 79-83 supra.
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feated were the trustee to pose as a creditor who obtained a garnishment lien
in a foreign state.21'
Section 70(c) is made even more lethal by the Constance v. Harvey 212
rule that a trustee can not only postulate an ideal lien creditor but can pick
the time at which he hypothetically extended credit to -the debtor.213 This
additional assumption enables the trustee to defeat a secured lender when
state law allows an unsecured creditor who extended credit during the hiatus
between a secured loan and its recordation to subsequently perfect a lien
on the property.2 1 4  Conceivably, this doctrine can permit the trustee to
defeat most state exemption increases. Since the contracts clause of the
Constitution renders an increase in state exemptions ineffective against a
pre-amendent creditor,215 Constance might allow the trustee to posit the ex-
tension of credit by a hypothetical ideal lienor before the most recent revision,
or perhaps before any within the lifetime of the debtor. Thus property
presently immune from all actual creditors could be rendered available to
the trustee.2 16
The employment of section 70(c) (with or without the Constance gloss)
to defeat an exemption is neither desirable nor necessary. It deprives the
211. See text at notes 94-96 supra.
212. 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
213. See 4 COLLIER ff 70.51, at 97 n.7, 98 (Supp. 1958).
214. In Constance the bankrupt had given a chattel mortgage which remained in-
effectively recorded for ten months. Even assuming the mortgage was recorded prior to
bankruptcy, the trustee prevailed under § 70(c) since according to New York law a late
recorded chattel mortgage is void as to simple contract creditors without notice whose
claims arise prior to actual recording. Since such a creditor could obtain a lien at the
time of the petition, so can the trustee under § 70(c). Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d
571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 913 (1955). See generally 4 COLLIER ff 70.51;
Marsh, Constance v. Harvey-The "Strong-Arm Clause" Re-Evaluated, 43 CALIF. L.
REv. 65 (1955) (criticizing Constance).
215. See notes 84-89 supra and accompanying text. The incorporation of state ex-
emptions has been held to extend the inflexibility of state legislation to federal bankruptcy
law. See England v. Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Samuels v. Quartin, 108
F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1940) ; In re Towers, 146 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd sub
iom. Towers v. Curry, 247 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1957). This result would be both un-
necessary and illogical. Not only are congressional enactments immune from the consti-
tutional prohibition, but every discharge in bankruptcy impairs the contracts of creditors.
Moreover, Bankruptcy Act § 6, which incorporates state exemption laws "in force at the
time of filing of the petition," can be read to require that increased state exemptions be
applied to contracts antedating the amendment, notwithstanding the constitutional limita-
tions. See It re Richards, 64 F. Supp. 923, 924 (S.D. Tex. 1946) ; In re Crayton, 56
F.2d 282 (W.D. N.Y. 1932).
216. In England v. Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956), the trustee recovered
$5,000 for the estate--the difference between the $7,500 homestead California provided
prior to 1945 and the $12,500 provided in 1953. In this case, however, there were in fact
creditors whose claims arose prior to the latest California amendment and it was there-
fore unnecessary for the trustee to hypothesize them. See In re Towers, 146 F. Supp. 882
(N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd sub norn. Towers v. Curry, 247 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1.957) (same).
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bankrupt of property which state policy finds necessary for the support of
him and his dependents, irrespective of the ability of an actual creditor to
invalidate the exemption. Clearly, the section was never intended to work
such havoc. Rather it was designed to permit the trustee to recover for the
benefit of the estate property on which the debtor had granted a secret lien,2 17
since the trustee formerly acquired only the rights of the debtor, and secret
consensual liens are valid between the parties.218 Consequently, the section
should be amended, or interpreted, to preclude the application of the ideal
lien creditor test to exempt property.219 This course would not be unjust to
an actual creditor who may obtain a lien upon otherwise exempt property
since under the Lockwood case he could still perfect his interest in state
court.
Waiver of Exemptions
Although exemptions are in large measure designed to protect the debtor
from his own improvidence, both the Bankruptcy Act and some states allow
him to waive their benefits. Under state law a failure to file a timely declara-
tion of intent to claim an exemption constitutes an effective waiver.220 In
addition, some states sanction a contractual waiver of exemption rights in
favor of a particular creditor,22 ' and two states hold the right to claim an
exemption assignable to the creditor.222 Since waivers undermine exemption
objectives, other states refuse to enforce them while executory, on grounds
217. See 45 CoNG. REc. 2277 (1910).
218. Ibid.; York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.S. 344 (1906); see 4 COLLIER l If 70.45-.47.
219. This was once the prevailing position of the courts. See Brand v. Mayhew, 218
Fed. 422 (9th Cir. 1914) (such application would defeat the policy of incorporating state
exemption); it. re Carl, 38 F. Supp. 414 (W.D. Ark. 1941.).
220. See, e.g., Acosta v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, 214 La. 700, 38 So. 2d 391 (1948)
(homestead) ; Gledhill v. Walker, 143 Ohio St. 381, 385-86, 55 N.E.2d 647, 650 (1944)
(same); Smith v. Phlegar, 73 Ariz. 11, 19, 236 P.2d 749, 755 (1951) (personalty);
Rames v. Norbraten, 65 S.D. 269, 272 N.W. 826 (1.937) (same); Tinsley v. Bauer, 125
Cal. App. 2d 724, 732, 271 P.2d 116, 121 (1954) (Dist. Ct. App. same); McKinty v.
Butts, 217 Ill. App. 234 (1920) (same) ; Gilewicz v. Goldberg, 69 App. Div. 438, 74 N.Y.
Supp. 984 (1902) (same) ; Russell v. Dean, 30 Hun. 242 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1883) (same).
221. E.g., McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Vaughn, 130 Ala. 314, 30 So. 363
(1.900); Lawrence v. Commercial Banking Corp., 165 Md. 559, 169 At. 69 (1933);
Beatty v. Rankin, 139 Pa. 358, 21 AtI. 74 (1891) ; Opportunity Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Silverman, 38 Pa. D. & C. 575 (C.P. 1940); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1.101 (1938). Some
jurisdictions which forbid a married debtor to waive, permit one who is single to forego
his exemption. E.g., Powell v. Daily, 163 Ill. 646, 45 N.E. 414 (1896). The executory
waiver is commonly contained in the note evidencing the debt. For some other methods,
see 1 Colmua 11 6.10, at 825 n.3. For an excellent discussion of the early laws and cases,
see 2 FmEMAN, ExEcUnONS § 216 (3d ed. 1900).
222. Lyle v. Roswell Store, Inc., 187 Ga. 386, 200 S.E. 702 (1938); Citizens Bank
& Trust Co. v. Pendergrass Banking Co., 164 Ga. 302, 138 S.E. 223, 226 (1927) ; Saul
v. Bowers, 155 Ga. 450, 117 S.E. 86 (1923) ; In re National Grocer Co., 181 Fed. 33 (6th
Cir. 1910) (construing Michigan law); see MicHi. STAT. ANN. § 27.1547 (1935).
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of public policy,223 and those that allow them often restrict their use. For
example, waiver of homestead exemptions generally requires signature of
the spouse and acknowledgment of the instrument. 22 4  Contractual waivers
are not enforced in bankruptcy, for under Lockwood the bankruptcy court
has no jurisdiction to administer exempt property or to adjudicate conflicting
claims therein. But the court will give effect to valid state waivers, by re-
taining the property and withholding discharge until the waiver creditor has
perfected his interest in a state court.
A waiver may also result from a failure to list exempt property in the
schedules of assets and liabilities required in bankruptcy. 225 Since a bank-
ruptcy court will not force the bankrupt to claim an exemption nor allow
the waiver creditor to assert it for him, 226 a bankruptcy waiver makes other-
wise exempt property available for distribution to the general creditors. Thus,
the waiver is conceptualized as the waiver creditor's security interest, inchoate
until an exemption is claimed. 22 7
The destruction of a waiver creditor's rights by virtue of a bankrupt's
failure to claim an exemption contravenes state policy by giving general
creditors property they could not otherwise reach, and denying waiver credi-
tors property they could otherwise obtain. On the other hand, if the bank-
ruptcy courts have ignored waivers of unclaimed exemptions in order to
foster a federal policy of debtor protection, 228 their efforts have been unavail-
ing. So long as a waiver creditor exists and the Lockwood rule withholds
discharge to allow him to obtain a state lien, the debtor will lose the property
-to the waiver creditor if he claims the exemption, and to the trustee if he
223. E.g., Industrial Loan & Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. 546, 209 Pac. 360
(1922); Weaver v. Lynch, 79 Colo. 537, 246 Pac. 789 (1926); Sherwin-Williams Co.
v. Morris, 25 Tenn. App. 272, 156 S.W.2d 350 (1941); OHIO REV. CODE: ANN. § 2329.72
(Page 1953); see Annot., 47 A.L.R. 300 (1927).
224. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1104 (1956); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 4
(1957); LA. CoNsT. art. 11, § 3.
225. In re Gerber, 186 Fed. 693, 699-700 (9th Cir. 1911) ; In. re Gunzberger, 268 Fed.
673, 676 (M.D. Pa. 1920) ; 1 COLLIER ff 6.19, at 872.
226. See Novak v. O'Neal, 201 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1953); Leiter v. Steinbach, 184
F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1950); It re Mattingly, 42 F. Supp. 83 (W.D. Ky. 1941); In re
Martin Bros., 294 Fed. 368 (N.D. Ga. 1923). Prior to Novak, at least one court distin-
guished between a creditor holding a waiver and one holding an assignment, and allowed
the latter to prevent the debtor from extinguishing his rights by failing to claim exemp-
tions in bankruptcy. Kronstadt v. Citizens & So. Natl Bank, 80 F.2d 260, 263 (5th Cir.
1935) ; see 1 CoLLIER f1 6.10, at 826-27. Although purporting to distinguish Kroustadt on
its facts, 201 F.2d 227 at 229, Novak seems to have, in effect, overruled it. See 201 F.2d
at 232 (dissenting opinion of Hutcheson, C.J., the author of Kronstadt) ; Nadler, Juris-
dictional Aspects of Assigned Exemptions, 16 GA. B.J. 178 (1953).
227. See In re Martin Bros., 294 Fed. 368, 370 (N.D. Ga. 1923) ; 3 REmINGTToN 8
1313-14, at 238-39; cf. Glenn, Property Exempt from Creditors' Rights of Realization,
26 VA. L. REv. 127, 138 (1939).
228. See It re Martin Bros., supra note 227, at 370; MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY
164 (1956); WAPLES, HOMESTEAD AND ExEmPTo 540-41 (1893).
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does not. Thus, a debtor's interest in the property is reduced to the power
of choosing whether it will go to the trustee or the waiver holder.
While a waiver may serve as a quasi-security device when a borrower has
no collateral and a lender nothing else to rely on,229 typical waivers apparently
include all assets whenever acquired, 23 0 and the absence of restrictions on the
number of waivers a debtor may execute 231 and requirements of notice to
subsequent lenders give them many of the characteristics of secret, inchoate,
floating charges, traditionally condemned in bankruptcy.23 2 Moreover, they
are only technically "consensual," since a waiver of exemptions seems to be
a standard provision in lender-prepared promissory note forms in those states
where waivers are sanctioned.23 3
If Congress followed the lead of the majority of the states 234 by providing
that executory consensual waivers will not be recognized when the bankrupt
claims his exemption, exemptions would become an even stronger device for
debtor rehabilitation. The bankrupt would no longer forego claiming his
exemption, since he would receive its benefits. This would not be unduly
unjust to the waiver holder, who could still transform his inchoate "security"
interest into a judicial lien by reducing his claim to judgment in a state court
prior to bankruptcy. Such a lien would not be avoided by section 67 (a) (1),
since Hall excluded waiver liens from the operation of that section.2 30
In the unlikely event that a bankrupt fails to claim an exemption, this
would operate as a waiver in bankruptcy. But the debtor's abandonment of
229. See Kronstadt v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank, 80 F.2d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 1935).
230. See Leiter v. Steinbach, 184 F.2d 751, 752 1.1 (5th Cir. 1950) (setting out text
of a waiver note).
231. Cf. Novak v. O'Neal, 201 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1953) (more than one waiver
creditor) ; Saul v. Bowers, 155 Ga. 450, 117 S.E. 86 (1923) (same).
232. "[F]or thirty-five years Congress has consistently reached out to strike down
secret transfers, and the courts have with equal consistency found its efforts faulty or
insufficient to that end." Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434,
438 (1943). "The committee reported in 1910 that the evil that it had attempted to cor-
rect in 1903 and was still struggling with was the prevention of secret liens . . . ." Hirsch-
feld v. Nogle, 5 F. Supp. 234, 236 (E.D. Ill. 1933).
See Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.S. 516 (1905) (upholding a floating charge on
stock in trade in the form of a chattel mortgage). Legislative history indicates that this
case typifies some of the evils at which the 1938 bankruptcy amendments were directed.
See Hearings on H.R. 6439 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 121-25 (1937).
,See generally H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1937); 3 COLLIER f111
60.37, at 877, 879, 883, 60.38 at 900; MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 166 (1956).
233. The waiver provisions of the promissory notes set out in the following cases all
bear a striking similarity in language. See Leiter v. Steinbach, 184 F.2d 751, 752 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1950) ; Kronstadt v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank, 80 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1935) ;
In re Martin Bros., 294 Fed. 368, 369 (N.D. Ga. 1923) ; Saul v. Bowers, 155 Ga. 450,
117 S.E. 86 (1.923); cf. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 164 (1956).
234. See cases cited note 223 supra.
235. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511, 516 (1913).
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his interest in the asset should not benefit the general creditors at the expense
of the waiver holder. The rationale that allowing the court to set aside, for a
waiver creditor, unclaimed exempt property would violate Lockwood 236 is
not persuasive. That case held that once property is set off as exempt, the
general creditors have no interest therein, and a contest between debtor and
waiver creditor must be settled in another forum. But when the 'bankrupt fails
to claim an exemption, a dispute arises between a creditor alleging a superior
claim and the other creditors. Such controversies are the traditional meat of
bankruptcy. Therefore, if the bankrupt forfeits his exemption, the waiver
holder should not be prevented from setting up the generally exempt nature
of the property and his special rights.
EXEMPTIONS IN MODERN SOCIETY
State exemptions, sired by the nineteenth-century economy and later adopted
by the Bankruptcy Act, have failed to grow up. The dollar has depreciated.
Wealth forms and occupational patterns have changed. Economic stability
at high living standards has been achieved. New attitudes toward govern-
mental responsibility for financial disaster have developed. 237 But state ex-
emptions have inadequately responded to these phenomena. Nonetheless, their
incorporation in bankruptcy goes virtually unchallenged. 238 While this Com-
ment has recommended the Act's modification in order to delete inconsistencies
or self-defeating provisions, it has thus far assumed continued bankruptcy
utilization of state exemptions. More basic reform may, however, be war-
ranted. This section will consider the contemporary need for exemptions,
and explore alternative methods of reaching their underlying goal of debtor
relief and rehabilitation.
Social Welfare Legislation-A Complete Alternative?
Although the exclusion of specified assets from creditors' claims may have
seemed to be the only proper means of debtor rehabilitation in an era which
emphasized individual incentive and responsibility,239 the recent development
of welfare legislation suggests that the community, rather than creditors,
236. See Novak v. O'Neal, 201 F2d 227, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1953).
237. See CLARKE, SoCIAl. LEGiSLATION 443 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as
CLARKE]; SAmuELsox, EcoNoi ics 112-15, 118-20 (4th ed. 1958); Hearings on H.R.
9091, 9120, 10283, and 10284 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 154-55 (1956) [hereinafter cited as 1956 Hearings]; Mandelker, Judicial
Review in General Assistance, 6 J. PUB. L. 100, 104 (1957). See generally Wilcox,
Patterns of Social Legislation: Reflections on the Welfare State, 6 id. at 3 (1957).
238. See Novak v. O'Neal, 201 F.2d 227, 231 n.4 (5th Cir. 1953); cf. 1 CoLLIR f
6.02, at 795; Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 9, at 388-89 (1937).
239. See Vance, Homestead Exemption Laws, 7 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 441, 442 (1932);
Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 1023, 1024 (1937).
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ought to bear the burden of ameliorating the effects of bankruptcy.240 State
welfare programs, financed from general tax receipts, would spread the costs
of economic misfortune more widely,24 ' and perhaps more equitably. Ex-
tension of credit is a necessary economic function, and except insofar as they
knowingly allow a borrower to overextend himself, lenders are no more
responsible for the debtor's financial embarrassment than other members of
the community. Moreover, trained welfare personnel could more effectively
foster rehabilitation, by helping the bankrupt secure a new job or acquire
new skills. Family protection would also be bolstered, since funds would
be expended under staff supervision, thus not subject to the debtor's control
and possible improvidence. Finally, governmental assistance would presum-
ably be geared to need, while the exemption system permits some debtors to
emerge from bankruptcy with more property than is necessary and does not
provide for the bankrupt who has no assets out of which to claim an exemption.
But presently existing welfare legislation, as classified into categorical (or
special) assistance on the one hand and general assistance on the other,24 2
is probably not an adequate replacement for exemptions. Categorical assist-
ance, administered by the state and frequently supported by the federal
government, helps only those persons who, because of status or prior con-
tributions, qualify for payments.243 Typically, these programs aid the aged,
the blind, the disabled, the unemployed, and the uncared-for child,244 and
are not, as a rule, predicated on an individual showing of need.2 45 Unless the
discharged bankrupt happens to fit in one of these favored groups, he will
receive no benefit from such statutes. Although unemployment insurance
might appear to offer sustenance to many bankrupts, recent statistics indicate
240. See HANNA & MACLACHLAN, CASES ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION 95 (5th ed. 1957); cf. BURNS, SocIAL SEcuR Uy AND PUBLIC PoLicY 2
(1956).
241. For costs of assistance programs generally, see BuRNs, op. cit. supra note 240, at
151-248; FRIEDLANDER, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL WELFARE 231-32, 241, 571, 581-84, 593-602
(1955) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDLANDER]; TAX FOUNDATIONd IMPROVING PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE (1953).
242. See CL~AuRE 486; RIESENFELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SocIAL LEGISLATI N 683
(1950) ; tenBroek, The 1956 Aiendrnents to the Social Security Act: After the New
Loo-k-The First Thought, 6 J. PUB. L. 123, 127-29 (1957).
243. See CLARYE 486; RIESENFELD & MAXWEL, op. cit. supra note 242, at 763;
1956 Hearings 4, 7; Manelker, Judicial Review in General Assistance, 6 J. PUB. L. 100,
102 (1957) Mandelker, Exclusion and Removal Legislation, 1956 WIs. L. REv. 57,
57 n.2.
244. See S. REP. No. 1669, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, 52-61 (1950) ; CLA.E 552-642;
Mandelker, Judicial Review in General Assistance, 6 J. PUB. L. 100, 102 (1957) ; Mandel-
ker, The Need Test in General Assistance, 41 VA. L. REv. 893, 894 (1955).
245. See 1956 Hearings 35; Mandelker, Judicial Review in General Assistance, 6
J. PUB. L. 100, 105 & n.20 (1957) ("[C]riteria of public policy unrelated to need or
income maintenance condition the relief of dependent persons to whom the statutes
apply."); tenBroek, The 1956 Amendments to the Social Security Act: After the New
Look-The First Thought, 6 J. PUB. L. 123, 127-28 (1957).
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that the overwhelming majority are employed wage earners at the time pro-
ceedings are initiated.2 6 Thus, the average bankrupt desiring state aid is
relegated to reliance on general assistance.
Derived from the English poor laws, general assistance programs furnish
temporary cash or commodity allowances to eligible persons. 247 Although the
statutory tests of eligibility vary widely, all require the recipient to demon-
strate "need," and some retain the criteria of "pauperism" or "destitution." 24
In practice, a relief applicant must have so little property that he is unable to
sustain himself and his family, although the more liberal jurisdictions will
give aid to those holding some cash and life insurance, or even a modest
homestead. 249 Additional limitations on general assistance as an effective mode
of social welfare are the residency requirements in all but eight jurisdic-
tions.20 One-year residence is most common, but some statutes demand as
much as five years.251 Even if the applicant can surmount the residency and
necessity barriers, however, he will often find that the relief allowance is
inadequate to maintain a standard of living above the most meager subsis-
tence level. 252 Most programs are designed to enable the recipient to meet
only his most immediate and basic needs, with a view toward his early re-
246. Out of 1,327 bankruptcy petitions surveyed for March 1959, 1,061 bankrupts
were reported to be employed. See APENDIX col. 2.
247. See BURNs, THE AmIcAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYsTEm 339 (1949); CLAURR 486;
1956 Hearings 155; Mandelker, Judicial Review in General Assistance, 6 J. PUB. L.
100-01 (1957). See generally Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Asistance
Law, 43 CALIF. L. Rsv. 175 (1955).
248. See CLARKE 488-92, 499; Mandelker, Judicial Review in General Assistance,
6 J. PUB. L. 100, 102 (1957) ; Annot., 98 A.L.R. 870 (1935). See generally Mandelker,
The Need Test in General Assistance, 41 VA. L. REv. 893 (1955). Many localities will
also deny assistance to the "able bodied worker," thus further retarding rehabilitative
opportunities. See id. at 907-08.
249. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 74.08.010 (11) (Supp. 1957). See Burns,
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 65-66 (1956) ; CLARxE 489; FRDLANDER 254, 255;
Mandelker, The Need Test it General Assistance, 41 VA. L. REv. 893, 895-97, 899 &
n.15 (1955) ; cf. BURNs, THE AIERmcAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYsrms 341 (1949) ; Sorieri,
Role of the Welfare Departent in a Recession, 17 PuB. WELFARE 17, 18 (1959).
250. See CLARxE 506; Public Assistance, in READINGS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 498
(1948); Mandelker, The Settlement Requirement in. General Assistance, 1955 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 355, 356 n.2.
251. CLARU 506; FRIEDLANiDER 255 n.29. The variations among the states are great.
Some require residence in the county from which aid is sought, while others insist only
upon a state residence. And some require a local residence in addition to the state resi-
dence. See Mandelker, The Settlenent Requiremzent in General Assistance, 1955 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 355, 366-68 & nn.46-50 (collecting statutes).
252. See BURNS, THE AaIERiCAN SOCIAL SECURTYv SYsTmar 346-47, 350-56 (1949);
CLARKE 490; Mandelker, The Need Test in. General Assistance, 41 VA. L. REv. 893, 904-
05 (1955). See generally 1956 Hearings 83, 119-20, 121, 138, 142-43; Public Assistance,
in PEADINGS IN SociAL SEcmURITY 492 (1948).
Further barriers facing the relief applicant stem from the difficulties in reviewing
denials of relief by administrators. See CLAR E 492-96; Mandelker, Judicial Review in
General Assistance, 6 J. PUB. L. 100 (1957).
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moval from the relief rolls.2 5 3 Many state legislators and relief administra-
tors are seemingly wedded to the puritan philosophy that public aid en-
courages moral weakness, and it should be denied wherever possible. -5 4 In
fact, some jurisdictions retain the Elizabethan requirement of a "pauper's
oath," cause recipient's names to be published and disenfranchise them.255
Only recently has the necessity of giving greater attention to the debtor's
long-term requirements and his reestablishment as a socially productive per-
son been recognized.
25 6
General assistance also suffers from lack of uniformity. Historically the
poor laws were the responsibility of the parish-the smallest unit of govern-
ment-and today general assistance is administered by over 10,000 count)
,
and municipal governments. 25 7 As a result, disparity in both the availability
of aid and the quality of its administration occurs even within the borders of
a single state.2 58 Furthermore, most agencies lack both the funds and the
trained personnel to adequately investigate an applicant's requirements and
supervise his rehabilitation, although some of the larger cities constitute not-
able exceptions.
259
253. See CLARIE 489; Mandelker, The Need Test in General Assistance, 41 VA. L.
REv. 893, 904-05 (1955); Smith, supra note 245, at 271.
254. See CLARKE 493, 499; MARTZ, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT: A
STUDY OF COUNTY WELFARE BoARDs 20 (1948); 1956 Hearings 141, 143.
255. See, e.g., DEL. ConsT. art. 5, § 2 (pauper not qualified as elector) ; ME. CoNsT.
art. II, § 1 (same) ; Mo. CONsT. art. 8, § 2 (vote denied to any person kept in poorhouse
at public expense) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-278 (oath) 17-291 (names of poor are
public records) (1959); CLARKE 499; FRIEDLANDER 262-63. For a discussion of the
recent trend to make general assistance records public, and the deterrent effect this may
have on relief applicants, see Mandelker, Spare the Punishment and Save the Individual:
A New Approach to Client Fraud in General Assistance, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 739, 741-45
(1956).
256. See Mandelker, The Need Test in General Assistance, 41 VA. L. REv. 893, 907
& n.36 (1955). Congressional passage of the 1956 Social Security Amendments, which
were aimed, inter alia, at furthering self-care and self-support in categorical assistance,
has given new impetus to services and rehabilitation activity. See Barnard, New De-
velopments in Services to PA Recipients, 17 PUB. WELFARE 55 (1959); note 261 infra.
Although some states have codified attempted rehabilitation programs, e.g., WASH. REv.
CODE §§ 74.11.010-.900 (Supp. 1957), their success is hampered by insufficient funds and
lack of trained personnel. See FRIEDLANDER 259-60; 1956 Hearings 310.
257. See CLARKE 487; Public Assistance, in READINGS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 491
(1948) ; MARTZ, op. cit. supra note 254; Mandelker, Judicial Review in General Assist-
ance, 6 J. PuB. L. 100, 101 (1957).
258. See CLARKE 487-88; FRIEDLANDER 254-55; Mandelker, Judicial Review in General
Assistance, 6 J. PuB. L. 100, 102 (1957). The amount of financial aid and supervision
furnished by state agencies to localities also varies widely. But where general assistance
has been integrated with federally supported categorical assistance, the standards of
administration are usually improved. See CLARIE 487-88; Mandelker, supra at 101 &
nn.3, 4, 102.
259. See CLARKE 489, 499; Public Assistance, in READINGS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 491-
92 (1948) ; 1956 Hearings 6, 17, 19, 40, 41, 133, 167, 227; Barnard, New Developments
in Services to PA Recipients, 17 PuB. WELFARE 55, 60 (1959); Mandelker, Judicial
Review in General Assistance, 6 3. PUB. L. 100, 120 (1957).
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While a revamping of these programs, or the introduction of new ones, 260
could conceivably furnish a complete alternative to exemptions, such a course
would place upon the government a dual burden of providing interim support
and replacing those necessaries surrendered to creditors. Household furnish-
ings, cooking utensils and wearing apparel, for instance, would have to be
restored. Substitute housing would have to be secured for those bankrupts
whose homestead is surrendered. In addition, when a debtor's livelihood de-
pends upon an automobile, tools, or farm acreage, they would have to be fur-
nished if he is to continue his occupation. Not only would this involve large
expenditures of funds and talent, but it would inevitably impose unwanted
governmental controls upon many individuals who could, with the aid of
exemptions, reconstruct their lives without additional assistance. In striking
a balance between laissez-faire and a welfare economy, legislators have sought
to relive personal misfortune with a minimum impairment of self-reliance and
initiative.2 1' The welfare alternative to exemptions would seem to undercut
the philosophy implicit in most welfare legislation: help only to those who
cannot help themselves.
With complete reliance on social welfare an inadequate substitute, it is
clear that exemptions still have utility in a modern economy. Although this
would require creditors to bear the initial burdens of debtor relief, it is per-
haps not as unfair to them as might first appear. They have borne them for
many years without a noticeable adverse effect upon the growth and operation
of the credit system. Although complaints are occasionally lodged against the
excessive liberality of a few state statutes, 262 these criticisms are directed at the
magnitude of allowable exemptions, not at their existence. More important
than the absence of fundamental criticism, however, is the fact that creditors
as a class do not bear the ultimate burden of debtor relief for they are able to
260. For example, proposals have been advanced for the federal government to sup-
port local general assistance programs. See FRIPEDLANDER 255; 1956 Hearings 92, 95-98,
274-77; Sorieri, Role of the Welfare Department in a Recession, 17 PUB. WEIrARE 17,
41 (1959).
261. See tenBroek, The 1956 Amendments to the Social Security Act: After the
New Look-The First Thought, 6 J. PuB. L. 123, 129 (1957). This policy has been
implemented through making receipt of relief payments more difficult. These have
included the "less eligibility" principle that grants should never exceed the earnings
of the lowest class of independent worker, use of stringent needs tests, limitations on
the duration of benefits, availability for substitute employment, and various administrative
controls on malingering. See BuRxs, SocIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 56-79 (1956).
Congress, in 1956, codified these heretofore implicit aims by amending the categorical
assistance programs specifically to include self-care and self-support in the purposes of
federally supported welfare. 70 Stat. 848-50 (1956), 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302(a) (11), 601,
602(a) (12), 1201, 1202(a) (13), 1351, 1352(a) (12) (Supp. V, 1958); see S. REP. No.
2156, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1956).
262. See Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 9, at 388 (1937); 11 N.Y. Jun. CouN. REP. 270 (1945); Krause, What You
Should Know About Bankruptcy: A Shield as Well as a Sword!, Student Law. J., Feb.
1959, p. 24.
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spread the costs to society as a whole through control of the interest rate and
the availability of tax deductions for business bad debts.2 63 Finally, the aboli-
tion of exemptions would be uneconomical. The debtor's personal property is
not likely to bring a large return for creditors when sold on the second hand
market. 264 But much of it will remain useful to the bankrupt.265 Continuation
of exemptions, however, need not imply a total avoidance of social welfare
programs. Bankrupts whose exemptions are insufficient for effective main-
tenance and rehabilitation, either because they have no exempt assets or be-
cause the statutory allowance is too small, will require assistance. Given the
similarity in purpose of the two systems, defects in existing exemption legisla-
tion should be remedied with social welfare programs-both present and po-
tential-in mind.
Toward a Modern System of Exemptions
Historically, exemption statutes have been justified in terms of three funda-
mental policies. Legislators have sought to encourage debtor rehabilitation 206
(e.g., tools-of-the-trade exemptions); to provide minimum security for his
family 267 (e.g., homestead and household necessities) ; and to relieve the com-
munity of some of the burdens of social welfare 268 (e.g., wages and personal
property). But exemptions have also been utilized to achieve extraneous goals.
Homestead laws, for example, have been used to encourage migration to
sparsely populated areas, and to foster home ownership.269 Exemptions for
church pews, Bibles, and burial lots are based largely on religious considera-
tions. The numerous provisions immunizing farm tools and animals, as well
as agricultural acreage and crops, constitute the most obvious use of exemp-
tions to serve a select class of debtors and encourage a particular livelihood.2 7 0
263. See INT. REV. CODE: OF 1954, § 166.
264. See In re Richards, 64 F. Supp. 923, 925 n.4 (S.D. Tex. 1946).
265. See Abraham v. Davenport, 73 Iowa 111, 113, 34 N.W. 767, 768 (1887).
266. See In re Hindman, 104 Fed. 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1900) ; In re Mattingly, 42 F.
Supp. 83, 84 (W.D. Ky. 1941) ; Perfection Paint Prods. v. Johnson, 330 P.2d 829, 830-31
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Howell v. Boyd, 2 Cal. App. 486, 490, 84 Pac. 315, 317
(Dist. Ct. App. 1905) ; Talbot v. Scogin, 147 So. 722, 723 (La. Ct. App. 1933).
267. See Estate of Kachigian, 20 Cal. 2d 787, 791, 128 P.2d 865, 867 (1942) ; In re
Keough's Estate, 42 Misc. 387, 392-99, 86 N.Y. Supp. 807, 810-15 (Surr. Ct. 1904);
First Nat'l Bank v. Tiffany, 40 Wash. 2d 193, 202, 242 P.2d 169, 173 (1952) ; WAPIEs,
HOmSTEAD AND EXErmPTiOS 3 (1893); Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L.
Rxv. 1289 (1950); Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 1023, 1024 & n.10 (1937).
268. See Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Jones, 117 A2d 226, 227 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. App. 1955) ; Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So. 2d 792, 794 (Fla. 1954) Young v. Geter, 185
La. 709, 715-16, 170 So. 240, 241-42 (1936) ; Maschke v. O'Brien, 142, Pa. Super. 559,
563, 17 A.2d 923, 924 (1941).
269. See Haskins, supra note 267, at 1290; Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 1023, 1031 &
nn.64-69 (1937).
270. Virtually all states make provision for farm equipment and animals. See, e.g.,
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3504 (1949); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.1543 (Supp. 1957);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 550.37(6), (11) (Supp. 1958) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.435 (1952) ;
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT. §§ 665(4), (7); TEx. R~v. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 3832 (1945);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 272.18(6) (1958) ; Annot., 107 A.L.R. 614 (1937).
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A modern exemption program, however, should not require creditors to sub-
sidize such secondary goals as home ownership and the pastoral way of life.
But the fundamental policies of exemption legislation-support and rehabili-
tation for the debtor and his family-remain as crucial today as they were in
biblical times.27 ' The overriding problem is thus not one of redefining ends,
but of finding modern means to achieve those ends.
Any proposal to reform exemptions must take account of the number of
bankruptcies and the typical financial condition of bankrupts. The number of
bankruptcy cases oscillated between 15,000 and 25,000 yearly from 1905 to
1921, rose to 70,000 during the 1930's depression, tapered off to a record
low of 10,000 in 1946, and has climbed steadily thereafter.272 The fiscal year
1958 saw, for the second successive year, an all-time peak in the number of
bankruptcy cases.273 Of the more than 91,000 petitions filed, over 80,000
were non-business bankruptcies, and 73,000 of these were employees.2 74 Al-
though no figures are available to determine precisely how many of the re-
maining 11,000 business bankruptcies involved corporations, it is probable that
a substantial number were unincorporated entrepreneurs and professionals.2 7 5
The overwhelming majority of the total cases filed were commenced volun-
tarily, 76,000 as straight bankruptcy proceedings and 13,000 under Chapter
271. See Exodus 22:26-27; Deuteronomy 24:6, 10-13.
272. U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFicE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, TABLES OF BANKRTUPTCY
STATISTics chart 1 (1958) [hereinafter cited as BKCY. STATISTICS]. There was, however,
a slight dip in the number of cases filed in 1951-1952.
273. BxcY. STATIsTicS 1, chart 1. This figure represented an increase of 24.3%
over fiscal 1957. Id. at 1.
274. BxcY. STATisTcs chart 2, table F 3. The nonbusiness bankruptcies increased
by 16,647 over fiscal 1957. Nonbusiness filings in 1958 represented 87.6% of the total
bankruptcies, as compared to 86.3% in 1957. Id. at 1.
275. Cf. APPENDIX. The Tables of Bankruptcy Statistics prepared by the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts in accordance with § 53 of the Bankruptcy Act
are broken down into the following occupational classifications:





Others not in business 6,870 16
Merchant 2,922 582
Manufacturer 562 196
Others in business 5,904 621
Totals 90,250 1,418
tFarmers and wage earners are not subject to involuntary proceed-
ings. Bankruptcy Act § 4(b). Farmer is defined in § 1(17). Compare
the definition of wage earner in § 1(32) for purposes of involuntary
bankruptcy with the definition of wage earner in § 606(8) for purposes
of eligibility for Chapter XIII Wage Earner plans.
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XlII's Wage Earner Plan, providing for a court supervised arrangement pro-
cedure enabling the debtor to satisfy his obligations over an extended period
rather than to extinguish them.2 7 6 The balance were either involuntary straight
bankruptcies (1,413) or under the chapters relating to special arrangements
and reorganizations (816) .277 These figures indicate that the typical 1958
bankrupt was a wage earner who voluntarily initiated proceedings.
The second crucial pattern that emerges from an analysis of bankruptcy
statistics is that liquidation provides virtually no recovery for general credi-
tors. Of the 66,000 estates administered in fiscal 1958 under the straight bank-
ruptcy provisions of the act, 49,000 (747o) had no assets whatever above
allowable exemptions, 8,600 (13%) had some nonexempt property, but no
assets remained after the payment of administrative expenses, and only 8,500
(13%) had net assets for distribution to creditors.2 7 8 But even in this last
category creditors fared badly. Overall, only eighteen per cent of allowable
claims were paid: the secured claimants realizing seventy per cent of their
claims, the priority claimants thirty-three per cent, and the unsecured credi-
tors (with seventy-four per cent of all provable debts) only seven cents on the
dollar.27 9
Who Are the Bankrupts?
Unfortunately, statistics concerning the type and amount of claimed exemp-
tions have been unavailable. To obtain this information, the Yale Law Journal
276. BKcY. STATISTICS 2, table F 2. The voluntary straight bankruptcies increased
by 26% over 1957. Id. at 1.
The wage earner proceeding is voluntarily commenced by filing a petition stating
that the debtor is a wage earner (as defined by Bankruptcy Act § 606(8)), that he is
unable to pay his debts as they mature and that he desires to enter into a composition
or extension, or both, out of his future earnings. A plan is submitted with the petition
for confirmation by the court. The confirmation order generally appoints a trustee, fixes
the amount to be paid and the mode of distribution, and directs the employer to pay
the trustee. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 601-86. For more detailed descriptions of wage
earner plans, see 9 COLLIER 1111 21.01-33.05; Allgood, Chapter XIII: Wage Earners'
Plans, 15 REF. J. 20 (1940); Banks, The Forgotten Remedy: Wage Earners' Plans
Under the Bankruptcy Act, 33 N.C.L. REv. 439 (1955); Bundschu, Administration of
Wage Earners' Plans in the Bankruptcy Court, 18 REF. J. 55 (1944) ; Bundschu, Pro-
ceedings under Chapter XIII, 25 id. 15 (1951) ; Maulitz, Operations under Chapter XIII,
27 id. 68 (1953) ; Rice, The Trustee under Chapter XIII, 30 id. 102 (1956); Sloan,
Wage Earners' Plans, 33 id. 5 (1959) ; Woodbridge, Wage Earners' Plans in the Federal
Courts, 26 MINN. L. Ray. 775 (1942).
277. BKCv. STATISTICS table F 2. Of the voluntary petitions, 2 were filed under
Chapter IX, dealing with municipal debt readjustments, 62 were filed under Chapter X,
the corporate reorganization provisions, 724 were filed under Chapter XI, dealing with
arrangements for small corporations and individuals, and 23 were filed under Chapter
XII, dealing with real property arrangements by persons other than corporations. Five
involuntary petitions were filed under Chapter X. Ibid.
278. BiccY. STATISTICS 2. The number of no asset cases increased 11,094 over 1957,
while the number of nominal asset cases increased by only 2,081. Id. at 4.
279. BKcY. STATISTICS table F 6.
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sent a questionnaire to one hundred four district court clerks, requesting data on
the first twenty-five individual petitions filed in March 1959. Seventy-eight
questionnaires from forty-four jurisdictions, containing figures on 1,327 bank-
rupts, were returned.2 80 These responses reveal the following facts: almost
eighty per cent of all bankrupts were employed by others at the time of filing
the petition; just under ten per cent were apparently self-employed; and just
over ten per cent were either involuntarily unemployed or not available for
work.281 Over eighty-eight per cent claimed some exempt property, but the
range was enormous-from just a few dollars to over $35,000.282 The same
disparity is disclosed if, in those states reporting five or more bankruptcies
(40), the two lowest claimed exemptions (excluding bankrupts who claim
no exceptions) are averaged and compared with the two highest claims. Na-
tionally, these figures are $161 and $5,831 respectively.283 Similar disparity
exists among the states: the average exemption claimed by Maryland bank-
rupts is $188, while Florida claims averaged $7,427.284 Nationally, the average
individual claim for all bankrupts (including those who claimed no exemp-
tions) was $943. 2 5
The questionnaire also sought to determine what items are most typically
claimed as exempt. Eighty per cent of the bankrupts polled claimed household
goods and wearing apparel, for an average value of $343.286 Twelve per cent
claimed a homestead, averaging $3,568 in value.2 8 7 Tools of the trade were
280. The Yale Law Journal wishes to thank the clerks of the United States District
Courts for their time and cooperation. Although results are tabulated for only forty-four
jurisdictions, one questionnaire was received from Alaska too late for inclusion, and
one from South Carolina reported no bankruptcy filings for the period.
The questionnaire took the form of a chart requesting the following information for
each petition: occupation of the bankrupt; whether bankrupt is employed; amount of
liabilities; amount of assets; whether asset figure includes exempt property; total
claimed exemptions; value of household furniture and wearing apparel claimed; value
of homestead claimed; value of insurance claimed and whether claim is at face or cash
value; value of tools of the trade claimed; whether other sizeable exemptions are claimed,
and if so, a description of type and value. This information was obtained from the
bankruptcy schedules filed by each voluntary and involuntary bankrupt. The questionnaire
directed the Clerks to the relevant schedule for each item of information requested. The
returned questionnaires are on file in Yale Law Library. The resulting tabulations are
presented in an appendix at the end of the Comment [hereinafter cited as APPENDIX].
281. See APPENDIx cols. 2 (employed), 4 (self-employed), 3 (unemployed).
282. See APPENDIX cols. 1, 7. The highest individual claim of $81,700 was made
by a Florida haberdasher. But if his claim of insurance at $45,000 face value is deducted,
the amount is $36,700.
283. See APPENDIX cols. 8, 9. The national averages were obtained by adding the
figures in cols. 8 and 9, and dividing each total by 40 (the number of jurisdictions
reporting 5 or more bankrupts).
284. See APPENDIX col. 10.
285. See APPENDIX cols. 1, 11. There were, however, only 208 bankrupts (15.7%)
who claimed more than $1,000. Id. col. 6.
286. See APPENDIX cols. 12, 13.
287. See APPENDIX cols. 14, 15.
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claimed by nine per cent, at an average value of $445.288 (But if the $17,400
claim of a Washington State fruit and vegetable wholesaler is eliminated, the
national average is reduced to $303.)2 s 9 Seventy bankrupts, or five per cent,
claimed life insurance as exempt.290 The average value was difficult to deter-
mine, however, since the face value of the policy, rather than the cash surren-
der, is often stated in the petition. In the thirty-one instances where cash
value was specified, the claimed exemptions averaged $1,053.291 In addition,
337 petitions, or twenty-five per cent, claimed an automobile averaging $309
in value.292 Finally, the data were analyzed to determine whether self-employed
bankrupts claimed higher than average exemptions. Comprising approximately
ten per cent of all bankrupts, they claimed twenty-five per cent of all exemp-
tions, averaging $2,485--or almost three times that of the overall average.20 3
Perhaps the most significant conclusion emerging from these figures is that
one fixed method of determining exemptions should not be applied to all bank-
rupts. If exemptions are geared to the needs of the typical bankrupt-the wage
earner who rents his home and has a modest amount of furniture and clothing-
they will not provide the self-employed with sufficient capital to start another
business or buy another farm. Conversely, if they are large enough to facili-
tate the entrepreneur's rehabilitation, the wage earner will retain more assets
than necessary, and creditors' expectations will be needlessly defeated. Finally,
exemptions, no matter how computed, are of no help to the bankrupt who
lacks the figurative shirt on his back. Consequently, three potentially over-
lapping categories of bankrupts must be considered in choosing reform: the
entrepreneur who needs a capital allowance for rehabilitation, the wage earn-
er who needs a moderate amount of personal property for his maintenance,
and the debtor who has no assets whatever.
Conceivably, the varying needs of these groups could be met by providing
differing exemptions to each of them. Thus, the self-employed would surren-
der fewer assets for distribution to his creditors than the employee. But such
a distinction is administratively unworkable. It would be difficult or impossible
to determine at the time of bankruptcy which entrepreneurs will resume their
trade, and which will become another's employee, or retire. Conversely, an
employee who intended to go into business for himself after discharge would
288. See APPENDIX cols. 20, 21.
289. Ibid.
290. See APPENDIX cols. 16, 17.
291. See APPENDIX cols. 16, 18. The average value of the face amounts claimed
was $6,605. See APPENDIX cots. 17, 19.
292. See APPENDIX cols. 22, 23. Unlike its treatment of household goods, the Journal
Questionnaire did not include a column requesting information on whether or not an
automobile was claimed as exempt. But the Questionnaire, in a sample answer, listed a
car as an "other exemption" of significant value. Automobile exemptions present par-
ticular problems. Many jurisdictions do not specifically exempt automobiles, while
those that do, may permit them under various classifications, thus making analysis
difficult. See note 64 supra.
293. See APPENDIX cols. 4, 5.
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seem equally entitled to the larger exemption. But he also could not be feasibly
isolated.
Therefore, a tripartite approach is indicated. Exemptions should be set at
a uniform level for all debtors, high enough to enable the average bankrupt
to maintain a respectable if modest standard of living. Bankrupts who wish
to resume or assume an independent calling might qualify for government
assistance in the form of a capital loan. And those who lack any assets even
after the allowance of exemptions should be able to resort to welfare assis-
tance.
Uniform Cash Exemption
Abolition of the exemption of specific assets is the most fundamental step
in the attainment of a modern exemption system. The bankrupt should sur-
render all of his property to the trustee and be accorded a dollar allowance
out of its value. He could realize this allowance or use it in whole or in part
to "repurchase" any relinquished items he wishes to retain. With the cash,
he could procure items necessary for his family's support or start a new life-
perhaps by moving to another community, acquiring a skill or trade, or in-
vesting in a business venture. This course has several advantages. It treats
bankrupts equally, without regard to whether their assets-either by chance or
by design-meet the statutory description of exempt property. Consequently,
converting nonexempt property on the eve of bankruptcy would no longer
be profitable.20 4 Secondly, it avoids all problems of recovery of exempt assets
under the avoiding sections of the Bankruptcy Act, for there would no longer
be a distinction between "exempt" and "nonexempt. ' '295 Thirdly, exemptions
would never become anachronistic, for money, unlike animals and turnips,
always measures wealth accurately.296 Moreover, a cash exemption can reflect
alterations in the dollar's purchasing power, either by periodic amendment,
or more profitably, by automatic annual changes, geared to some economic
indicator such as per capita income or a retail price index.297 Since the cost
of living varies materially in different geographical areas, 298 Congress could
conveniently choose economic indicators computed on a state or regional
basis. Thus geographical exemption would accurately reflect geographical eco-
nomic variety.
Exemption uniformity could be accomplished in three ways: the existing
policy allocating responsibility for exemptions to the states could be retained
and revised; the current framework could be abandoned in favor of a uniform
federal exemption; or a compromise between the two established. Although
294. See text at notes 140-48 supra.
295. See text at notes 154-219 supra.
296. See text at notes 57-62 supra.
297. See Comment, 26 C,,iF. L. REv. 466, 471 (1938).
298. See U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENsus, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STAT sTicAL ABsnRcr
OF THE UNiTED STATES 333-35 (1958).
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significant improvements can be made within the present statutory pattern by
modernizing state exemptions and removing inconsistencies in the Bankruptcy
Act, lack of uniformity, conflicts of law problems and difficulties engendered
by the contracts clause-to list only the most obvious disadvantages-would
remain. Admittedly, the adoption of a uniform state exemption would meet
many of these objections. But the difficulties in obtaining local amendment,
and particularly a uniform codification, are enormous, 2 9 especially in this
area, where the alteration of state policies is likely to evoke emotional con-
troversy. More fundamentally, however, traditional state exemption statutes
could not be adapted to a cash exemption system, for they invariably go to an
individual creditor's rights, not a total liquidation and distribution of a debtor's
estate. For example, were state statutes to make available to creditors all
assets except $1,000 in cash or property, an inventory of the debtor's assets
would be required every time a creditor attempted to attach or levy.300 Con-
ceivably, states might enact a separate bankruptcy exemption 301 in terms of a
cash allowance, but this is unlikely. A second alternative would be a compro-
mise based on the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.302 This would entail a minimum
federal exemption to ensure essential family protection and debtor rehabilita-
tion, but would recognize state exemptions in excess of the federal minimum.
Although this approach would give some recognition to regional variations,
the goals of equal treatment and uniform administration would be defeated.
Furthermore, in those states, such as California, which provide extremely
liberal exemptions, the federal policy fostering the repayment of debts would
be subserved.
Consequently, the best way to accomplish the primary goals of relief and
rehabilitation appears to be a uniform federal cash exemption. Such an exemp-
tion is neither unprecedented nor constitutionally objectionable.30 3 Bankruptcy
is a federal function, specifically delegated to Congress in the Constitution.30 4
299. Of the 109 uniform and model acts approved by the National Conference of
Commissions on Uniform State Laws, 30 have not been adopted by any jurisdiction. Of
the 79 acts adopted in one or more jurisdictions, 57 have been accepted in less than
half. See Tables of States Adopting Acts in 1-10 U.L.A. (1957); cf. Gilmore, On the
Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YA.ix L.J. 1341 (1948).
300. Generally, all the debtor must do at present is make his claim in writing when
the exempt asset is levied upon. E.g., CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE ANN. § 690.26(1) (1955);
IL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 52, § 14 (1957). An appraisal of the asset's value may occur either
when it is claimed, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.445 (1952); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 272.19
(1958), or when an execution creditor complains that its value is greater than the
allowable exemption, In.. Rsv. STAT. ch. 52, § 10 (1957); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 272.21
(1958).
301. No state appears to have a separate bankruptcy exemption at this time, and
only Virginia seems to make any conscious effort to coordinate part of its exemption
statute to bankruptcy. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-17 (1953).
302. See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, § 14, 14 Stat. 522-23.
303. See Novak v. O'Neal, 201 F.2d 227, 231 n.4 (5th Cir. 1953) ; 1 CoL= 6.02,
at 795.
304. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
1508 [Vol. 68:1459
BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS
And exemptions are integral to any bankruptcy legislation. Indeed, the Bank-
ruptcy Acts of 1800 305 and 1841 306 both specified federal exemptions with-
out reference to state practice, and it was in fact the provisions of the 1867
and 1898 acts, incorporating local law, that met challenge on the ground that
those exemptions did not provide "uniform Laws on the subject of bank-
ruptcies" as constitutionally commanded. 30 7
The amount of a uniform exemption is a delicate political question to which
this Comment cannot provide a firm answer, but guides for Congress may be
suggested. Through investigation, Congress could determine the minimum
needs of persons making fresh beginnings in life: discharged servicemen, re-
cent graduates, ex-convicts, and newlyweds, as well as bankrupts. To balance
the fact that discharged bankrupts may own used assets of a low market
value, and thus not start completely anew, Congress could take into considera-
tion the minimum accumulations of property by solvent wage earners. The
data available to the Yale Law Journal suggests that an effective cash exemp-
tion could be on the order of $1,000. This would allow the debtor to reclaim
his household goods and wearing apparel-which averaged, prior to bank-
ruptcy, $350 in value.30 8 In addition, he could keep (or secure) a $300-500
automobile, necessary tools, or a modest life insurance policy, as well as a
small amount of cash to meet special needs or emergencies. To this might be
added a special allowance for a married bankrupt (say $300) and each child
that he supports (perhaps $1CO), as well as an allowance for the unemployed
debtor who is no longer entitled to unemployment compensation. A relatively
low exemption could encourage more wage earners-the typical bankrupt-
to take advantage of the Bankruptcy Act's wage earner plan.309 Under Chap-
ter XIII, the debtor can retain his property, while entering into a court super-
vised plan for repayment of his debts out of his single significant asset-his
future wages.3 1 0 Such a composition achieves the goal of rehabilitation with-
305. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 5, 2 Stat. 23.
306. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, § 3, 5 Stat. 442.
307. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188-90 (1902) (1898 Act);
In re Deckert, 7 Fed. Cas. 334, 336 (No. 3728) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874) (1867 Act) ; In re
Beckerford, 3 Fed. Cas. 26, 27 (No. 1209) (C.C.D. Mo. 1870) (same).
308. See APPENDIX col. 13.
309. Bankruptcy Act §§ 601-86.
310. Since the primary concept is that the debtor effect the composition or extension
out of his future earnings, the court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor's
earnings and wages during the period of the plan. Bankruptcy Act § 611. Exclusive
jurisdiction over the debtor's property is also obtained. Ibid. To enable the debtor to
consummate the plan, proceedings against his property may be enjoined or stayed. Bank-
ruptcy Act §§ 614, 625. Thus, so long as the debtor continues the plan, he will be able
to retain his property. Cf. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Oliver, 230 F.2d 686 (10th
Cir. 1956). If the plan fails of completion the court may order that bankruptcy be pro-
ceeded with pursuant to the act. Bankruptcy Act § 666. And if the debtor has properly
claimed his exemptions, they are preserved to him as under § 6. Bankruptcy Act § 637.
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out the necessity of a liquidation, and often ensures greater creditor recovery
without undue damage to the debtor.31 '
The proposed federal exemption will necessarily become interrelated with
state statutes immunizing property from attachment and levy. In those states
whose provisions are less than the federal allowance, voluntary bankruptcies
will become more attractive. Thus, the inadequacies of state law can be sur-
mounted. Where state exemptions exceed the federal grant, however, creditors
will seek to institute involuntary proceedings, rather than rely on state execu-
tion procedures. But there can be no such proceedings absent an act of bank-
ruptcy by the debtor.312 Since the sufferance of a lien is such an act, the para-
mountcy of a federal policy of creditor satisfaction (while providing for ade-
quate debtor relief) could be ensured, if no other act of bankruptcy is avail-
able to the creditors, by a new wrinkle on the "hypothetical lien" concept.
Section 3(a) (3) could be amended to provide that the requisite act is deemed
to have been committed whenever a debtor has property, valued in excess of
the federal allowance, which is free from a lien only because of its exempt
status under state law. Thus the creditors could utilize section 3(a) (3) to
furnish the basis of an involuntary petition just as if one of them was in the
group which may attach otherwise exempt property, 313 and in whose favor a
lien hypothetically attached.
Plus Aid to the Pauper-Bankrupt. The most serious rehabilitation prob-
lem is the bankrupt who has little or no assets. An exemption canot help him,
no matter what form it assumes. The close relationship between the aims of
exemptions and social welfare and the desirability of providing for all bank-
rupts suggests that the bankruptcy court should automatically refer the pau-
per-debtor to the appropriate local agencies. By itself, however, referral is not
enough, for welfare allowances are sometimes unavailable, often too meager, 314
and of no help to the individual who needs a lump sum rather than a small
weekly allowance. Since bankruptcy is a federal responsibility, it would be
appropriate for the national government to supplement state aid to bankrupts.
311. See Allgood, Chapter XIII-Referee Allgood of Alabama Replies to Referee
Walker, 33 RF. J. 51 (1959); Covey, What's Happening in Bankruptcy, 32 id. 76, 79
(1958); Sloan, Wage Earners' Plan, 33 id. 5, 6 (1959). See also articles cited note
276 supra. For criticisms of Wage Earner Plans, see MACLAcHLAN, BANKRUPTCr 374-
75 (1956); Walker, Is Chapter XIII a Milestone on the Path to the Welfare State?,
33 REF. J. 7 (1959).
312. The six acts of bankruptcy are: (1) a fraudulent transfer; (2) a preferential
transfer; (3) suffering or permitting a creditor to obtain a lien; (4) a general assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors; (5) the appointment of a receiver; (6) the admission
in writing of inability to pay debts and willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt. See
Bankruptcy Act § 3.
The involuntary petition must be filed by three or more creditors whose claims aggre-
gate more than $500. But if the debtor has less than twelve creditors, then any one of
them whose claim is more than $500 may file the petition. See Bankruptcy Act § 59.
313. See notes 77-83 supra and accompanying text.
314. See notes 250-52 supra and accompanying text.
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For example, all persons whose property available for an exemption claim is
worth substantially less than the uniform exemption could be referred to the
appropriate local agency, who would determine what assets the bankrupt needs
most, and furnish funds in an amount approaching the uniform figure. Where
desirable, the agency would control the expenditure of the funds. The money
thus advanced plus applicable administrative expenses would then be charged
to the federal government. This expenditure can be financed from the general
revenues or from a special fund, analogous to the referees' salary and ex-
pense fund, derived from bankruptcy filing fees. 315
Plus Aid to the Entrepreneur-Bankrupt. A uniform cash exemption suited
to the needs of the typical bankrupt would also prove inadequate for entre-
preneurs wanting to start afresh. The policy of encouraging the self-employed
to continue his occupation is implicit in many current exemption provisions-
most clearly in the case of farm acreage, equipment and livestock. The Yale
Law Journal questionnaire indicates the success of these statutes; self-
employed bankrupts were, on the average, able to exempt almost three times
as much property as their brethren.316 If this policy is to be continued under
a uniform cash exemption system, capital funds could be most efficiently se-
cured from public sources, such as a federal agency which would lend (or per-
haps give) money to discharged bankrupts with the experience and initiative
necessary to successfully prosecute a new venture.
While somewhat persuasive criticisms of the proposed capital-assistance
program may be put forth, they ignore equally or more compelling arguments
on the other side. Thus it may be said that bankrupts are per se poor credit
risks.3 1 7 But during a national or regional slump, many able businessmen
fail, and in generally prosperous times, bankruptcies may result from a declin-
ing trade or unsuitable farmland. Nor does it follow that the man who makes
one fatal mistake in judgment is bound to make another. Those bankrupts
who are in fact poor risks would simply not qualify for a loan. Similarly, the
argument that the government should not become a rival of private lenders
disregards the various existing federal programs designed to allow and en-
315. Each petition filed must be accompanied by a filing fee of $45. Bankruptcy
Act § 40(c) (1) provides that $17 of the fee shall go to the referees' salary fund and
$15 shall go to the referees' expense fund. These fees are supplemented by additional
fees based upon the net proceeds realized from the estate. Bankruptcy Act § 40(c) (4) ;
BANR uPTcy AcT 60-63 (Collier pamphlet ed. 1956). At the end of fiscal 1958 both
funds had a combined surplus of over $6 million. Bxcy. STATISTICS letter of trcnmidttal.
316. See APPNmDix. Column 5 (total claimed by self-employed) is deducted from
column 11 (total claimed exemptions). Column 4 (number of self-employed) is then
deducted from column 1 (number of bankrupts). The quotient obtained by dividing these
two remainders is compared with the quotient obtained by dividing the total of column
5 by the total of column 4.
317. Cf. Malspies, Public Capitalizationt of New Business, 10 MIAmi L.Q. 1, 13
(1955) (bankruptcy is one of the factors considered by the Small Business Administra-
tion in evaluating a loan applicant's good character).
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courage economic rebirth through grant and loan.318 Indeed, this rivalry is
more imaginary than real, since private lenders -will not usually make loans
to bankrupts.31 9
The administration of a federal capital assistance program could be assigned
to the Small Business Administration, whose operations are analogous. The
SBA makes short term loans to qualified enterprises when private credit is
unavailable. °2 0 Long term credits and equity capital will also be available,
as a result of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, from private invest-
ment companies, initially financed with SBA funds.321 The proposed program,
however, would necessitate an alteration and enlargment of the SBA's present
functions. Current classifications of size for "small business"' 322 would have
to be reevaluated to encompass sole proprietors with very few, if any, em-
ployees. Also, the present practice of making loans only to going businesses
would have to be abandoned.
323
Once established, a bankruptcy division of the SBA should make capital
funds available to discharged bankrupts whether or not they were self-employed
immediately prior to bankruptcy. Of course, all applicants would have to
establish their experience and capacity to run a business, and prepare-with
318. See, e.g., Homestead Acts, 12 Stat. 392 (1862), as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-
301 (1952); Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (G.I. Bill of Rights), 58 Stat. 284(codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.) ; Small Business Act, 67 Stat. 232 (1953),
as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 631-47 (Supp. 1958).
319. Existing programs are usually not in conflict with private lenders, for they
are limited to situations where private funds are unavailable at reasonable terms. See,
e.g., Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 388, 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a) (1) (Supp. 1958); SAUL-
NIER, HALCROW & JAcOBY, FEDERAL LENDING AND LOAN I sURANcE 72 (1958); Mal-
spies, rupra note 317, at 9, 12; McCallum, Loans by the Small Business Administration,
13 Bus. LAw. 349-50 (1958).
320. The Small Business Administration, successor to the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, was established in 1953. 67 Stat. 232 (1953), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§
631-47 (Supp. 1958). See generally Baum, The Small Business Administration: Sone
Potential Problems, 27 U. CINc. L. Rzv. 270 (1958); Malspies, supra note 317; Mc-
Callum, supra note 319; Schoen, The Small Business Administration, 17 MD. L. REV. 30
(1957).
321. 72 Stat. 689, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 661-96 (Supp. 1958) ; see H.R. REP. No. 2060, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) ; S. REP. No. 1652, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) ; CoNF. REP. No.
2492, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
322. The statute defines a small business concern as "one which is independently
owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation' 72 Stat. 384,
15 U.S.C.A. § 632 (Supp. 1958). Authority is granted to the Administrator to use
other criteria in making a more detailed definition. Ibid. Having found that a single
definition is unrealistic, the SBA has adopted flexible categories that vary by industry.
See 21 Fed. Reg. 9709 (1956), 22 Fed. Reg. 2121, 3314, 4190 (1957), 23 Fed. Reg.
2636, 3099 (1958), 24 Fed. Reg. 1246, 2090, 2091 (1959), 13 C.F.R. §§ 121.3-1 to -8
(1959). But it would seem that existing classifications are more concerned with setting
the upper limits of size and volume than with the problems of the very small business.
See Baum, supra note 320, at 270-75; Malspies, supra note 317, at 9-10.
323. Cf. id. at 9-10.
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agency assistance-plans demonstrating the proposed projects' feasibiility.324
To ensure that funds are economically employed, they should be available
only to persons willing to make the effort necessary for economic success.
Consequently, long term loans at, or near, the commercial rate of interest
would seem preferable to outright gifts.3 2 5 If the plan proves workable, it
might be expanded to assist other bankrupts who need funds to acquire new
sidlls or further education, to move to a more prosperous area, or to apply
to other rehabilitative purposes.
Safeguarding Family Security
Problems of the exemption system itself aside, the Bankruptcy Act should
be amended to realize more effectively the exemption goal of security for a
bankrupt's dependents. At present the discharged family is insufficiently
protected: the debtor can dispose of his exempt assets irresponsibly. Under
the proposed uniform cash exemption system, the typical bankrupt-neither
pauper nor entrepreneur-would get unsupervised control of the funds. Al-
though a few states have attempted to safeguard the family,326 the methods
of control are imprecise and some of the consequences undesirable. For ex-
ample, state statutes barring alienability of homesteads without the consent of
both spouses 327 only prevent the debtor from encumbering or disposing of
one type of property, and in so doing serves to clog credit.
A more comprehensive approach to family protection might be based on
the British example. Under the English bankruptcy act, the trustee may
grant the debtor periodic allowances for family support during pendency of
the proceedings, subject to review by a creditors' inspection committee. 28
The American statute could adopt this approach by substituting the bank-
ruptcy court for the inspection committee. The court could advise the bank-
rupt's dependents of the availability of periodic allowances. If special pro-
tection is needed, they could petition for guardianship, and the necessity
324. Similar evidence of the applicant's abilities and the probability of repayment
must be shown under the existing program. See id. at 14; McCallum, supra note 319, at
350-51.
325. The present SBA requirement that loans be secured or of sound financial value
may have to be somewhat relaxed. If the SBA were to use the same criteria as banks
do, the discharged bankrupt would never receive a loan. For criticism of current SBA
practice, see Baum, supra note 320, at 275-78.
326. See, e.g., ILu.. REv. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 2, 15 (1957) (exemption continues for re-
maining spouse after death or desertion); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.450 (1952) (wife may
claim if husband absconds or absents himself) ; W. VA. CoDE- ANN. § 3899 (1955) (either
spouse may claim exemption); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 272.20 (1958) (homestead can be
claimed by either spouse). See generally Joslin, Bankruptcy from a Family Law Per-
spcctive, 9 VAND. L. REv. 789 (1956).
327. See, e.g., L.. CONST. art. 11, § 3; ARIz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1104 (1956);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 52, § 4 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.475(2) (1952).
328. The Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 58; see 1 CoLLiER ff 6.01,
at 793; WILLIAms, BAN RUPTCY 424 (17th ed. 1958).
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thereof would be decided by the court. Supervisory jurisdiction following
discharge might similarly be ordered, if necessitated by an irresponsible head
of a household. Such a case could be referred to a local welfare agency, which
would return any remaining assets to the debtor or his spouse when solvency
is achieved.
Summary
The purposes of exemption legislation cannot be fully achieved under the
current system of federal incorporation of state exemptions; they are both
too varied and too outmoded. Specific-asset exemptions fail to reflect present-
day standards of wealth-holding. A policy of even-handed debtor relief and
rehabilitation dictates a cash exemption, federally enacted and tied to an
accurate economic indicator. The special problems posed by the entrepreneur-
or pauper-bankrupt could be solved by the proposed capital loan and social
welfare program.
The last comprehensive revision of the Bankruptcy Act took place twenty-
one years ago.329 And over sixty years have elapsed since passage of the Act
of 1898 which gave effect to state exemptions in bankruptcy. Congressional
re-examination of bankruptcy exemptions is long overdue.
329. The Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (codified in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.), was a major revision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544.
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